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NOTE
UNITED STATES AND JAPANESE GOVERNMENT
PROCUREMENT: THE IMPACT ON TRADE
RELATIONS
In the decades following World War II, the United States made mas-
sive expenditures to rebuild Japan.1 Once Japan recovered economi-
cally from the war, trade between the two countries became
increasingly important and mutually beneficial.2 As a result of internal
I. At the end of the Second World War, the United States undertook two basic projects: the
resolution of Japanese security and military problems and the establishment of Japanese eco-
nomic recovery. See C. LEE & H. SATO, U.S. POLICY TOWARD JAPAN AND KOREA: A CHANGING
INFLUENCE RELATIONSHIP 2-6 (1982). These two themes became inextricably intertwined.
The United States disarmed and demilitarized Japan at the end of the war. K. LATOURETTE, A
SHORT HISTORY OF THE FAR EAST 732 (4th ed. 1964). This action eliminated the need for the
Japanese to make massive capital expenditures for military procurement and allowed these funds
to be used instead to rebuild the economic structure of the nation. It also committed the United
States to the military protection of Japan. Id at 733. The United States further assisted Japanese
economic recovery through the expenditure of $2.118 billion in aid from 1945 to 1951. Another
$741 million was expended on Allied procurement within Japan during this period. C. LEE & H.
SATO. supra, at 5.
The presence of American military forces remains noticeable in Japan, although the formal
occupation ended in September 195 . K. LATOURETTE, supra, at 741-42. In the Mutual Security
Treaty of 1960, the United States agreed to defend Japan. In return, Japan agreed to defend its
homeland and granted the United States the right to use bases and facilities on Japanese soil. F.
GREENE, STRESSES IN U.S.-JAPANESE SECURITY RELATIONS 31-2 (1975). Today, Japan remains
unenthusiastic about expanding her military focus beyond the home islands, although Japan re-
cently indicated a willingness to increase its defense expenditures. N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1983, at 3,
col. 4. See also C. LEE & H. SATO, supra at 128. The authors indicate that the United States
considers Japan a "free rider." This term means that Japan "failed to assume international re-
sponsibilities commensurate with its newly acquired economic power while depending heavily on
the United States for its own defense." Id
2. In 1981 and 1982, the Umted States imported goods from Japan worth $37.61 billion and
$37.74 billion; during those two years the United States exported to Japan $21.82 billion and
$20.96 billion. 63 BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, SURVEY
OF CURRENT BUSINESS, No. 11, S 16-17 (November 1983).
From the end of World War II until the early 1970s, most industrialized nations had as their
international economic policy objective the expansion of access for their goods in foreign markets.
J JACKSON, THE LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 1 (1977). In the
1950s and 1960s. the United States' share of world trade and world GNP declined as a result of
the world recovery from World War II. COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS, ECONOMIC REPORT
OF THE PRESIDENT 51-55 (1983). In the 1970s, this decline leveled off and remained constant
through 1980. Id. at 53. The 1983 Economic Report of the President recognized the recent in-
crease in demands for protectionist policies from American industry and urged that "[tihese
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pressures, each country imposed domestic constraints on private inter-
national trade.3 Antagonism resulted from the belief that Japan
adopted more significant restraints than the United States, thereby de-
stroying reciprocity4 between the two nations. Thus, the belief arose
that the United States remained "open" as a mentor of free trade while
problems must not be allowed to disrupt world trade. If the system comes apart-if the world's
nations allow themselves to be caught up in a spiral of retaliatory trade restrictions - a long time
may pass before the pieces are put back together." Id. at 51. The report also observed that
"[d]uring the 1970s the world's market economies became more integrated with each other than
ever before .... This close linkage of economics was mutually beneficial." Id.
3. See generally Foreign Barriers to U.S. Trade: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Interna-
tional Finance and Monetary Policy of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
Part II--Merhandise Exports, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1982) (as of March 1982, 27 major food
items imported by Japan were subject to import quotas); U.S.-Japanese Agricultural Trade Rela-
tions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Agricultural Policy of the Senate Comm. on 4gri-
culture, Nutrition, and Forestry, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1982) (Japan maintains strict protectionist
policies to insure that levels of rural income are consistent with urban incomes); Japanese and
American Economic Policies and U.S. Productivity: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Monetary and
Fiscal Policy and the Subcomm. On Trade, Productivity and Economic Growth of the Joint Economic
Comm., 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1981) (explaining "infant industry approach" employed by Japa-
nese government that uses direct government subsidies and protectionist policies to stimulate
fledgling industries; once industry develops capability to compete with foreign competitors, Japa-
nese domestic market becomes open to imports); U.S.-Japanese Economic Relations. Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on International Trade, Finance, and Security Economics Comm., 97th Cong.
1st Sess. 12 (1981) (documenting Japan's recent advances in computers and industrial robotics);
U.S.-Japanese Trade Regulations: Hearing Before the Joint Economic Comm., 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 10 (1979) (describing Japanese automobile distribution system as non-tariff barrier to trade
because American manufacturer must sell his products to Japanese firm with existing exclusive
dealerships); Borrus, Millstein & Zysman, International Competition in Advanced Industrial Sec-
tors: Trade Development in the Semiconductor Industry (1982), in STAFF OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC
COMM., 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION IN ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SEC-
TORS: TRADE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SEMI-CONDUCTOR INDUSTRY 13 (Joint Comm. Print 1982)
(noting that the United States' dominance in semiconductor market resulted from "market pull"
created by Department of Defense and National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and that
Japanese industry had no such "pull"); STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 97TH
CONG., 2D SESS., GOVERNMENT DECISIONMAKING IN JAPAN: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED
STATES 10, 12 (Comm. Print 1982) (outlining Strauss-Ushiba Agreement in which Japan limited
restraints on agricultural imports including citrus and beef); REPORT BY THE COMPTROLLER GEN-
ERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, UNITED STATES-JAPAN TRADE: ISSUES AND PROBLEMS 177 (1979)
(outlining the practice of the Japanese government and its Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (MITI) of isolating key industries and assuring their growth) [hereinafter cited as IssuEs
AND PROBLEMS].
4. In the context of international trade, reciprocity means "a mutual exchange of trade or
other concessions or privileges (as reduction of tariff rates and liberalization of quota and ex-
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Japan fostered a "closed" market.5 Although both nations endorsed
change restrictions) between two countries." WEBSTERS THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTION-
ARY 1895 (16th ed. 1971). A more detailed definition is
• . it is a tactic, it is a means to our free market goal, not an end in itself.
The idea of reciprocity can best be summarized by a series of principles:
It is intended to open others' doors, not shut ours.
It is concerned with market access, not absolute trade levels or bilateral balances.
It approaches trade problems broadly, not sectorally.
It provides tools which are discretionary, not mandatory.
It is concerned with barriers to service and investment as well as goods.
It is directed at many countries, not just Japan.
It is intended to strengthen the multilateral process, not weaken it.
Trade Reciprocity.- Hearings on S.2067, S2071 and S2094 Before the Subcomm. on International
Trade of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1982) (testimony of Senator John
Heinz).
5. The most comprehensive and unbiased research on American-Japanese trade is THE JA-
PAN-UNITED STATES ECONOMIC RELATIONS GROUP, REPORT OF THE JAPAN-UNITED STATES
EcONoMIC RELATIONS GROUP (1981) [hereinafter cited as WISE MEN'S REPORT]. See also JA-
PAN-UNITED STATES ECONOMIC RELATIONS GROUP, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT OF THE JAPAN-
UNITED STATES ECONOMIC RELATIONS GROUP 31 (1981) (warning that the United States has yet
to understand the Japanese insecurity regarding its dependence on food imports). Established by
a joint communique between Japan's late Prime Minister Ohira and President Carter, the "pur-
pose of the Group is to examine factors affecting the bilateral economic relationship over the
longer-run and make recommendations to the President and the Prime Minister designed to
strengthen it." Id at L See generally Abbott & Totman, "Black Ships" and Balance Sheets: The
Japenese Market and U.S.-Japan Relations, 3 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 103, 107 (1981) (the reason
for the group's 'balance' lies in its composition: prominent members of Japanese and American
business, banking, government and education).
Whether Japan presents a closed or an open market depends greatly on one's perspective; the
Japanese consider their market to be open and consider it the American businessman's mistake
not to exploit it fully. WISE MEN'S REPORT, supra, at 54. While the Japanese feel they present
ample opportunities, they perceive a growing sense of protectionism in the United States, as evi-
denced by the Fair Practices in Automotive Products Act (H.R. 5133). This bill forces all domes-
tic and foreign manufacturers of automobiles that possess a market in the United States to include
a certain "domestic content ratio" of American parts and labor in each car produced. The ratio
vanes according to the number of cars sold in the United States. H.R. REP. No. 842, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess. 5 (1982). Because there was a significant increase in the proportion of Japanese
automobiles in the United States, from 15.2 percent in the fourth quarter of 1978 to 28.2 percent of
the American market in the third quarter of 1980, some saw this legislation as the answer to the
United States' auto industry problems. Id
Individuals detached from the auto industry assert that such legislation would disturb the bal-
ance of world trade, destroy as many jobs as it creates and "that it would not long be confined to
automobiles." N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1982, at A14, col. 1. More important, although the House of
Representatives amended and later passed the Fair Practices in Automotive Products Act by a roll
call vote, 2 CONG. INDEX (CCH) 34,512 (1982), the Reagan Administration remains opposed to it.
H.R. REP. No. 842, supra, at 35. Malcolm Baldridge, Secretary of Commerce, and John Block,
Secretary of Agriculture, observed that such legislation would be in violation of the United States'
commitment to the GATT. Id at 32-33.
For discussions of the Japanese-American tensions resulting from the automobile trade, see
generally de KiefferAntitrust and Japanese Auto Quotas, 8 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 59 (1982) (relax-
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the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)6 prior to the rise
ation of Japanese automobile imports reconfirms the importance of American antitrust laws
applied in an international context); Note, Regulating Japanese Automobile Imports" Some
Implications of the Voluntary Quota System, 5 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 431 (1982) (discussing
voluntary restraint agreements (VRAs) as a method of settlement between two trading partners in
which the exporter agrees to limit exports); Note, An Update of the Japanese Automobile Export
Restraint, 8 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 159 (1982) (Japanese compliance with United States' demands
for auto import relief not a reaffirmation of American industrial and economic superiority).
Some American businessmen claim that the Japanese market remains closed but admit the
presence of signs of improvement. In the tobacco and leather industries, however, American
sellers encounter a market closed by high tariffs and low import quotas. STAFF OF THE HousE
SUBCOMM. ON TRADE OF THE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 95TH CONG., 2D SEss., TASK FORCE
REPORT ON UNITED STATES-JAPAN TRADE 39-41 (Comm. Print 1979) (documenting Japanese
practice of importing raw products, such as leather and tobacco leaf, yet requiring the Japanese
industry to provide high value-added finishing of the products) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE].
On April 17, 1984, the Japanese agreed to substantial increases in imports from the U.S. for citrus
and beef. Japan Agrees to Buy More U.S. Beef Citrus U.S., Industry Drop Plans to File Col-
plaints, INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 27, at 838 (Apr. 10, 1984).
6. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) describes either the agreement or
the institution. Hudec, GA7T' or GABB? The Future Design of the General Agreement on Tarifs
and Trade, 80 YALE L.J. 1299, 1299 n.2 (1971).
During World War II, the United States became the principal impetus behind the creation of
the International Trade Organization (ITO) and GATT. J. JACKSON, supra note 2, at 396. "The
ITO was to have been the twin of the International Monetary Fund, a specialized agency of the
United Nations dealing with the non-monetary side of economic affairs - trade, economic devel-
opment, commodity agreements, restrictive business practices and employment policy." Hudec,
supra, at 1302 n.7. Although GATT focuses on tariff negotiations, the framers intended it to be
part of the larger framework of ITO. Comment, GA77Tand the Tokyo Round- Legal Implications
of the New Trade Agreement, 11 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 302, 302 n.3 (1981). The designers did not
intend GATT to become an organization. Moreover, Congress objected to the creation of such an
organization in hearings before the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance
Committee because the Executive did not possess the authority to place the United States in an
international organization without congressional approval. J. JACKSON, supra note 2, at 397. This
congressional resistence and the fading "aura of cooperation" in America immediately following
the war, caused the ITO charter to fail in Congress. Id at 398. Nonetheless, GATT eventually
evolved as an institution and sponsored a number of negotiations. Id At last count, 117 coun-
tries, accounting for over 80 percent of world trade, had signed the GATT. Ribicoff, The U.S.
Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 8 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 3, 3 (1982).
The scope of GATT, as an agreement, is very broad. The focus of GATT lies in Article II,
which contains the tariff schedules and outlines the commitments by each nation to minimize the
size of tariffs on imports. J. JACKSON, supra note 2, at 399. Article XIX, an article the United
States demanded, restricts the scope of Article II by presenting an escape or safeguard clause.
Merciai, Safeguard Measures in GA7TT, 15 J. WORLD TRADE L. 41, 42 (1981). Article XIX pro-
vides
1. (a) If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the obligations
incurred by a contracting party under this Agreement, including tariff concessions, any
product is being imported into the territory of that contracting party in such increased
quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic
producers in that territory of like or directly competitive products, the contracting party
shall be free, in respect of such product, and to the extent and for such time as maybe
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of current domestic protectionist pressures, both nations welcomed the
Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN)7 as an additional means of im-
proving international trade relations.
This Note focuses on the improvement of international trade rela-
tions through the use of one aspect of the MTN, the Government Pro-
curement Code (Code).8 Part one analyzes the continued protectionist
policies of the United States and Japan and the impact of these policies
on trade relations between the two countries.9 Part two discusses the
relevant portions of the Code and the ways those sections altered meth-
ods of government procurement. 1° Part three discusses the recent eas-
necessary to prevent or remedy such injury, to suspend the obligation in whole or in part or
to withdraw or modfy the concession.
J. JACKSON, DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT TO LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RE-
LATIONS 34 (1977) (emphasis added). As Merciai observed, "the objective [of Article XIX and
other similar escape clauses] is to enable a government to aid a certain industry which is no longer
internationally competitive." Merciai, supra, at 41. See infra notes 109-10 and accompanying
text.
7. The MTN resulted from the Tokyo Round that lasted five and one-half years and ended
in April 1979. It was one round in a series of amendments to GATT. Comment, supra note 6, at
302. In addition to a Government Procurement Code, discussed infra, the MTN outlines various
codes of conduct regulating non-tariff barriers to trade. These include codes on subsi-
dies/countervailing measures, antidumping, customs valuation, technical barriers to trade, import
licensing procedures, trade in civil aircraft, international dairy arrangement and bovine meat ar-
rangement. STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS AND SENATE COMM. ON Fi-
NANCE, 96TH CONG., IST SESS., MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS-INTERNATIONAL CODES
AGREED TO IN GENEVA, SWITZERLAND V (Joint Comm. Print 1979) [hereinafter cited as INTER-
NATIONAL CODES].
8. The Code standardized methods of government procurement of capital goods. The fed-
eral government possesses the authority to purchase from foreign manufacturers pursuant to the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2511-2518 (1982).
According to the preamble of the first revision, the Government Procurement Code reduces or
eliminates "non-tariff measures or, where this is not appropriate, their trade restricting or dis-
torting effects, and. . .bring[s] such measures under more effective international discipline." IN-
TERNATIONAL CODES, supra note 7, at 132. In addition, the preamble expresses the concern "that
it is desirable to provide transparency of laws, regulations, procedures and practices regarding
government procurement." Id The thrust of the preamble, therefore, is that signatory nations
will not discriminate against the products of other signatory nations. International Trade Adminis-
tration, U.S Department of Commerce, Agreement on Government Procurement: .4 Descriptive
Summary, reprinted in Impact of Non- Tariff Barriers on the Ability of Small Business to Export to
Japan: Hearing Before the Senate Select Comm. on Small Business, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 120-21
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Intern. Trade.4Admin. ]. The Code seeks to lessen non-tariff barriers to
trade by businesses in signatory nations and affects at least twenty-one nations. Anthony & Hag-
erty, Cautious Optimism as a Guide to Foreign Government Procurement, 11 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 1301, 1301 (1979). For a discussion of the Code's attempt to eliminate discriminatory prac-
tices, see infra notes 125-57 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 13-1 10 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 111-64 and accompanying text.
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ing of barriers to government procurement pursuant to the Code in the
telecommunications network of Japan, through the Nippon Telephone
and Telegraph (NTT) Agreement."I Part four concludes that the NTT
Agreement illustrates the benefits to both countries through the reduc-
tion of domestic restraints and urges the federal government to lessen
barriers to government procurement by eliminating such inefficient
protectionist legislation as the Buy American Act and the state buy-
national laws. 2
I. GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT IN THE UNITED STATES AND
JAPAN
Although the United States agreed to reduce barriers to government
procurement when it signed the Code, many domestic restraints re-
main. The Code must exist in harmony with federal laws. Yet, the
Buy American Act,13 Trade Agreements Act of 19791 and general gov-
ernment procurement procedures 5 clearly conflict with the general
purpose of the Code." In addition, some states use buy-national or
buy-local laws that create a secondary level of government procure-
ment barriers to foreign suppliers.' 7
The Japanese constructed significant barriers to government pro-
curement before the Code.'" Gradually, however, the Japanese gov-
ernment reevaluated and reduced some of these barriers. This change
in policy resulted in its acceptance of the MTN Code.' 9
11. See infra notes 165-81 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 182-88 and accompanying text.
13. 41 U.S.C. § lOa-d (1976).
14. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2501-2582 (Supp. V 1981).
15. 41 U.S.C. §§ 251-260 (1976).
16. These laws form a net of protectionist policies for American industry. Protectionism is
[i]n public commercial law, a system by which a government imposes customs duties
upon commodities of foreign origin or manufacture when imported into the country, for
the purpose of stimulating and developing the home production of the same or
equivalent articles, by discouraging the importation of foreign goods, or by raising the
price of foreign commodities to a point at which the home producers can successfully
compete with them.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1100 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
17. See infra notes 69-78 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 95-107 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 62:127
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A. The Buy American Act
In response to the unemployment pains of the Depression, 20 Con-
gress enacted the Buy American Act (Act)2' to restrict foreign competi-
tion for government procurement contracts. Although the Act purports
to insure that all government procurement contracts contain "domestic
source end products, ' 22 it also possesses many restrictions on this broad
purpose. For instance, it requires purchases to be consistent with the
public interest.23 Many procuring entities use this requirement as an
exception to allow them to make foreign purchases.24 In addition, the
20. Senator Johnson (California) introduced the Buy American Act as an amendment to
appropriations bill H.R. 13520 during the Depression. From the floor of the Senate, Senator
Davis (Pennsylvania) claimed that "[tihe adoption of this amendment will mean work for our
workers. It will help stem the tide of foreign competition and thus prevent further reduction of
wages of the American worker." 76 CONG. REC. 2985 (1933). A lack of unanimity existed, how-
ever, on the merits of the proposed bill. Senator Gore (Oklahoma) claimed "[the Act] will but
protract this depression, will multiply and aggravate its evils. . . . Trade in its very nature is
reciprocal. Trade cannot be ex parte. Trade can not be a one-way highway." 76 CONG. REc.
3178-79 (1933). It becomes obvious that the United States government sought to protect those
weak industries from foreign competition, rather than to take positive actions to improve the com-
petitiveness of those industries. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
21. 41 U.S.C § 10a d (1976).
22. The definition of "end product" is
articles, materials, and supplies which are to be acquired for public use. As to a given
contract, the end products are the items to be delivered to the Government, as specified
in the contract, including articles, materials, and supplies to be acquired by the Govern-
ment for public use in connection with service contracts.
41 C.F.R. § 1-6.101(a) (1982). The phrase "to be delivered" is central to this definition. See infra
note 34.
"Domestic source end product" is
an unmanufactured end product which has been mined or produced in the United
States, or an end product manufactured in the United States if the cost of its components
which are mined, produced or manufactured in the United States exceeds 50 percent of
the cost of all its components. The cost of components shall include transportation costs
to the place of incorporation into the end product and, in the case of components of
foreign origin, duty (whether or not a duty-free entry certificate may be issued).
41 C.F.R. § 1-6.101(d) (1982). There are two distinct inquiries: whether the end product's compo-
nents are less than 50 percent foreign and whether the end product is manufactured in the United
States or abroad. See Textron, Inc. v. Adams, 493 F. Supp. 824, 831 (D.D.C. 1980).
23. 41 U.S.C. § 10a (1976).
24. Gantt & Speck, Domestic v. Foreign Trade Problems in Federal Government Contracting:
BuyAmerican Act and Executive Order, 7 J. PuB. L. 378, 390 (1958). These authors claim that as
long as the public interest exception is broad enough to include all other exceptions to the Buy
American Act, see infra notes 25-28 and accompanying text, the public interest exception presents
.an undefined catchall to apply where general policy dictates an exception from the Act." Id at
390. See generally Buy American Act - Supply and Service Contracts, 41 C.F.R. § 1-6.103-3
(1982) (public interest exception also appies to supply and service contracts).
For litigation involving the public interest exception, see Self-Powered Lighting, Ltd. v. United
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statute applies only to goods manufactured "substantially all," or sev-
enty-five percent, from American resources.25 Finally, the Act fails to
apply if the goods are unavailable26 or if the acquisition is unreasona-
bly expensive27 or impracticable.28
Following World War II, commentators attacked the Act because it
placed restraints on American foreign policy. 29 President Eisenhower
further restricted the applicability of the Buy American Act in an Exec-
utive Order.3" First, the Order reduced the "substantially all" require-
States, 492 F. Supp. 1267 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (negotiated bidding and subsequent award to foreign
bidders best served the public interest when procurement officer believed only a few companies
would bid on the contract); In re Brown Boveri Corp., 56 Op. Comp. Gen. 596 (1977) (upholding
government's discretionary refusal to make award to foreign supplier despite understanding be-
tween Department of Defense and foreign government); Campbell Chain, 51 Op. Comp. Gen. 195
(1971) (decisions concerning question of public interest dictates an application of the Buy Ameri-
can Act and also presents a discretionary decision for the head of the procuring government
agency).
25. 41 U.S.C. § lOa-b(a) (1976). The "substantially all" requirement also applies to materials
used in construction contracts. Id § 10b(a).
The first buy national bills introduced in Congress, H.R. 10743 by Congressman Wilson and S.
5411 by Senator Steiwer, required "wholly" manufactured American goods as opposed to "sub-
stantially all." See 76 CONG. REc. 2072 (1933). When Senator Johnson introduced his amend-
ment to H.R. 13520 that requested only a "substantially all" provision, see spra note 20 and
accompanying text, Congress realized that it was a more moderate approach than the Wilson-
Steiwer bills. Id.
26. 41 U.S.C. § 10a (1976). The Buy American Act does not apply to goods and products
that "are not mined, produced or manufactured, as the case may be, in the United States in suffi-
cient and reasonably available commercial quantities and of a satisfactory quality." Id. (emphasis
added). See In re Maremont Corp., 55 Op. Comp. Gen. 1362 (1976) (machine guns); 32 Op.
Comp. Gen. 233 (1952) (copper); 21 Op. Comp. Gen. 298 (1941) (aluminum). These examples
illustrate perhaps the most widely used and least understood exception. Gantt & Speck, supra
note 23, at 392. See also Buy American Act - Supply and Service Contracts, 41 C.F.R. § 1-6.103-
2 (1982) (applying sufficient quantities criterion).
27. 41 U.S.C. § 10b(a) (1976).
28. Id. The expense and impracticable exceptions are in a stipulation to § 10b(a):
Provided, however, that if the head of the department... making the contract shall find
that in respect to some particular articles, materials or supplies it is impracticable to
make such requirement or that it would unreasonably increase the cost, an exception
shall be noted in the specifications as to that particular article ....
Id.
See, e.g., 39 Op. Comp. Gen. 309 (1959) (head of procuring agency with sole discretion to find
domestic supplier's bid exceeding foreign bid by 43% "unreasonable"); 39 Op. Comp. Gen. 435
(1959) (holding foreign bid acceptable when 36% under domestic bid).
29. Gantt & Speck, supra note 24, at 397.
30. Exec. Order No. 10,582, 3 C.F.R. 96 (1954), reprinted in 41 U.S.C. § 10d (1976). Presi-
dent Kennedy later modified this executive order to require the Director of the Office of Emer-
gency Planning to provide advice about government procurement if national security interests
were involved. Exec. Order No. 11,051, 3 C.F.R. 635 (1962) at § 603(e).
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ment to fifty percent.3 ' Second, the Order declared that a domestic bid
qualifies as unreasonable or inconsistent with the public interest if it
exceeds the cost of a foreign bid by six percent, resulting in the award
of the contract to the foreign supplier.32 Third, the Order required a
procuring authority to reject a foreign bid if that contract involved a
product costing less than $25,000 and the domestic bid exceeded the
foreign bid by less than ten percent of the cost of the foreign product.33
As these exceptions illustrate, the Buy American Act possesses a lim-
ited scope. Despite its inherent restrictions, however, it continues to
regulate business procedures in a manner contrary to the methods out-
lined by the MTN Government Procurement Code. 34 The labyrinth of
Buy American regulations fosters parochial favoritism that, in turn, ob-
structs the operation of the MTN Government Procurement Code.
31. Exec. Order No. 10,582, supra note 30, § 2(a).
32. Id § 2(b)-(c)(1). See infra note 33.
33. Id § 2(b)-(c)(2).
Subsequently, the federal government approved two changes in the Buy American Act that
favored domestic suppliers. First, if the domestic supplier qualifies as a small business concern or
conducts business in a labor surplus area, the procuring entity applies a twelve percent factor
instead of the six percent factor. Buy American Act-Supply and Service Contracts, 71 C.F.R.
§ 1-6.104-4(b) (1982). Therefore, the domestic supplier may receive the contract even though it
exceeds the foreign bid by up to twelve percent. The head of the procuring agency makes the
decision to award the contract to the domestic supplier in these situations. Id. Second, if an
adjusted foreign bid equals a domestic bid, the purchasing authority will award the contract to the
domestic supplier. Id.
34. Recently, for example, in Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Friedkin, 481 F. Supp. 1256 (M.D.
Pa.), afd, 635 F.2d 248 (3d Cir. 1980), a government agency only continued to consider a domes-
tic bid in the face of a lower Japanese bid because of the six percent adjustment factor of the Act.
The case involved a federal government contract for the construction of a hydroelectric plant
procured by the United States Section of the International Boundary and Water Commission
(Section) and aided by the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps). Id at 250. Pursuant to a compli-
cated bidding process, in March 1979 the plaintiff (Allis-Chalmers) submitted an adjusted bid
excluding service costs of just over $3,768 million, while Hitachi America submitted the lowest
foreign bid of $3.4 million including service changes. Id at 250-51. The Buy American Act sub-
jected the Hitachi bid to a surcharge of either six or twelve percent. Id at 25 1. After checking
with the Department of Labor, the Corps found that Allis-Chalmers conducted business in a labor
surplus area requiring the addition of the 12 percent factor to Hitachi's bid. Id Hitachi's final
and adjusted bid, including service costs, was approximately $20,000 less than Allis-Chalmers'
bid. Id at 251-52. The Section agreed with the Corps' recommendation to award the contract to
Hitachi, but decided that the six percent factor was appropriate. Id at 252. Allis-Chalmers pro-
tested these findings to the Comptroller General, who denied the protest and affirmed the award
of the contract to Hitachi. Id
Subsequently, Allis-Chalmers sued for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunc-
tion at the district court. 481 F. Supp. at 1262. The court denied the request, id at 1269, and the
court of appeals affirmed the denial of the motion in December 1980. 635 F.2d at 257. Thus,
Allis-Chalmers delayed the award of the contract for almost two years.
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B. The Trade Agreements Act of 1979
Although the Buy American Act continues to affect the government's
procurement of foreign goods, the Trade Agreements Act of 197931
(Trade Act), which implemented the MTN Government Procurement
Code,36 enables the President to waive partially or fully 37 any law of
the United States that would discriminate between products of domes-
tic and foreign suppliers or among foreign suppliers.38  It also allows
the President to withdraw such a waiver.39 In order to expand the cov-
erage of the Code, the Trade Act permits the President to designate
countries and instrumentalities that would reciprocate by providing
equal access to government procurement contracts for United States
suppliers.4 °
In 1980, another Executive Order radically altered the structure of
the Trade Act by delegating all of the functions reserved to the Presi-
dent under the Act to the United States Trade Representative
(USTR).4 ' In addition, the Order lists the executive agencies subject to
35. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2501-2582 (Supp. V 1981).
36. Id §§2511-2518
37. Id § 2511(a).
38. Id Section 2511 of the Trade Agreements Act states
[t]he President may waive, in whole or in part, with respect to eligible products of any
foreign country or instrumentality. . ., the application of any law,. . . that would, if
applied to such products and suppliers, result in treatment less favorable than that ac-
corded-
(1) to United States products and suppliers of such products; or
(2) to eligible products of another foreign country or instrumentality which is a party
to the Agreement and suppliers of such products.
Id The language and intent of this section parallels part V of the Code that endorses the non-
discrimination and transparency of the open tender procedure. See infra notes 139-43. More
important, however, this provision permits the President to waive the Buy American Act. See
supra notes 20-34 and accompanying text.
39. Id. § 2511(c).
40. Id § 2511(b). The President may place nations into three categories: least developed
countries that do not have to implement reciprocal benefits, major industrial nations that are
signatories to the Code, and all other nations that agree to institute reciprocal benefits. Id.
41. Exec. Order No. 12,260,46 Fed. Reg. 1,653 (1980), reprintedin 19 U.S.C. § 2511 (Supp. V
1981). As a result of this delegation, the President has no formal powers regarding government
procurement pursuant to the Act, even though the President may rescind the delegation of these
powers. The text of the Act still attributes the powers of the Act to the President. This Note,
however, acknowledges the role of the USTR by substituting that title for the President's.
The function of the USTR was
for developing, and for coordinating the implementation of, United States international
trade policy, including commodity matters and, to the extent they are related to interna-
tional trade policy, direct investment matters. The Trade Representative shall serve as
the principal advisor to the President on international trade policy and shall advise the
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the Code42 and provides that the USTR will consult with potential pro-
curing agencies.43
The Trade Act encourages nations to become signatories to the MTN
Government Procurement Code.44 It grants the USTR the authority to
entice non-signatory nations to implement the Code by offering them
conditional most-favored nation status, a condition generally available
only to signatories of the Code.45  The USTR also has the power to
implement procurement restrictions on the products of non-signatory
nations, 46 but must report such restrictions to Congress47 and recom-
mend legislation to increase the levels of procurement trade with these
sanctioned nations.48
The Trade Act also delimits the objectives of the renegotiation of
procurement agreements pursuant to the MTN Government Procure-
President on the impact of other policies of the United States government or interna-
tional trade.
Reorganization of Functions Relating to International Trade, Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1979,
§ 1, 93 Stat. 1381, 1381 (1979).
42. Exec. Order No. 12,260, supra note 41, § 1-101 and annex.
43. Id § 1-105.
44. See 19 U.S.C. § 2512(b) (Supp. V 1981) (succinctly stating this policy consideration).
45. Id. § 2512(a)(1).
46. This provision also prohibits domestic procuring entities from purchasing supplies from
countries that failed to sign the Code. See infra note 131. To mitigate the harshness of this rule,
the Act permits the USTR to waive the restraints on government procurement from non-signatory
nations for two years. 19 U.S.C. § 2512(b) (Supp. V 1981). The Act also lists required procedures
for procuring agencies when considering the appropriateness of a waiver. Id §§ 2512(b)(l)-(3).
These requirements include possible waiver of the prohibition by the USTR for a maximum of
two years; waiver by the agency head, subject to interagency review, made on a case by case basis
"when in the national interest;" and possible waiver by the Secretary of Defense of the procure-
ment restrictions on a nation that entered into a reciprocal agreement with the Department of
Defense. Id
47. Id § 2512(c)(1). The USTR reports the implementation of procurement restrictions to
the House Committee on Ways and Means and the Committee on Government Operations, as
well as to the Senate Committees on Finance and Government Affairs. Id. This preliminary
report must include an evaluation of alternative means needed to obtain equity and reciprocity;
the impact of these alternatives on employment, production and inflation; and an evaluation of
the impact of the Buy American Act in labor surplus areas. Id § 2512(c)(2). After this prelimi-
nary report, the USTR submits a final report containing the actions deemed necessary to improve
procurement trade with the sanctioned countries to the same congressional committees. Id.
§ 2512(d)(1). See infra note 54.
48. Id. § 2512(d)(1). Thus, the Act consciously attempts to bring developing nations under
the Code. Id. § 2512(c)(1). Prior to the delegation of all authority to the USTR pursuant to
Executive Order 12,260, the President had the power to submit legislation to Congress that would
implement these policies. Id § 2512(d)(2). Because the USTR has no power to introduce legisla-
tion, one must assume that the USTR recommends legislation to the President, who subsequently
introduces a bill into Congress.
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ment Code.49 The USTR seeks those products that facilitate govern-
ment procurement, the "appropriate product sectors,"5 and attempts to
verify information provided pursuant to the Code5 before recom-
mending renegotiation of a procurement agreement. The USTR also
takes precautionary steps if the renegotiations appear to be approach-
ing a deadlock.5 2 Once the respective governments negotiate or rene-
gotiate the procurement agreements, the Trade Act provides
monitoring53 and enforcement 54 procedures. After a two year monitor-
ing period, the USTR submits an evaluative case study to Congress
49. Id. § 2514(a). For the review process pursuant to part IX paragraph 6 of the Code, see
infra note 116.
50. 19 U.S.C. § 2514(b). The Act fails to define "appropriate product sectors." It states that
"[tihe President shall seek,. . . with respect to appropriate product sectors, competitive opportu-
nities for the export of United States products to the developed countries of the world equivalent
to the competitive opportunities afforded by the United States. ... Id From the context of this
section, "appropriate product sectors" refers to a broad category of products, void of unreasonable
specifications, appropriate to faciliate increased government procurement.
51. Id § 2514(c). See infra notes 149-53 and accompanying text. Part VI, paragraph 9 of the
Code provides that signatory nations will supply the Committee on Government Procurement, see
infra text accompanying notes 154-57, with the appropriate statistics on annual government pro-
curement contracts. The Committee compiles this information and the USTR then makes it avail-
able to Congress. 19 U.S.C. § 2517 (Supp. V 1981). The report includes the global statistics on the
value of the contracts awarded above and below the 150,000 SDR threshold, see infra note 124,
statistics on the number and value of contracts above the threshold broken down according to the
type of product, and statistics on the number and value of contracts awarded by the single tender
method pursuant to part V paragraph 15 of the Code.
52. 19 U.S.C. § 2514(d)(1) (Supp. V 1981). The precautionary steps include notification by
the USTR to the congressional committees listed in § 2512(c)(1) of the reasons for deadlock and
the possible solutions, as well as the introduction of corrective legislation. Id § 2514(d)(2)-(3).
53. Id § 2515(a). The Act requires close attention to the tendering procedures employed by
those countries for which the United States waived the Code pursuant to Section 251 l(b). Id.
The monitoring procedure of this section requires the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate to
issue advisory opinions on whether the procured product is "foreign." Id. § 2515(b)(1). The
determination of whether a product qualifies as foreign arises from a "rules of origin" test. As
defined,
[a]n article is a product of a country or instrumentality only if (i) it is wholly the growth,
product or manufacture of that country or instrumentality, or (ii) in the case of an article
which consists in whole or in part of materials from another country or instrumentality,
it has been substantially transformed into a new and different article of commerce with a
name, character or use distinct from that of the article or articles from which it was so
transformed.
Id § 2518(4)(B). If an article qualifies as foreign according to the rules of origin and if the coun-
try is nonsignatory to the Code, the USTR may waive the application of restrictive procurement
laws pursuant to § 251 l(a) if the nation qualifies under § 2511 (b).
54. Id § 2515(a). If evidence of fraudulent conduct in the determination of a product's ori-
gin arises during the monitoring process, the United States may initiate criminal proceedings. Id.
§ 2515(b)(2). According to 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976), any person who willfully schemes against or
defrauds a department or agency of the United Staes federal government by false "statement or
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recommending actions to improve foreign procurement of United
States' exports." Another USTR report informs Congress of the eco-
nomic impact of waiver of the Buy American Act in labor surplus
areas.
56
The reports of the USTR to Congress under the Trade Agreement
Act of 1979 remain integral to the support of the policy objectives of
encouraging nations to become signatories to the MTN Code and of
lessening barriers to government procurement among signatory na-
tions. The Trade Agreement Act's waiver of the Buy American Act
illustrates Congress' anticipation of increased reciprocal government
procurement trade. By implication, therefore, it acknowledged the in-
effectiveness of protectionist legislation.57
C. The United States' Government Procurement Procedures
While the Trade Agreement Act of 1979 implemented the MTN
Government Procurement Code, it failed to alter significantly the
United States' general government procurement procedures that con-
flict with the Code. These procurement practices have as their founda-
tion the open method of tender. Section 252(c) of Title 41 of the
United States Code requires procuring agencies to make all purchases
and contracts by advertisement, 58 resulting in a potentially large
number of bidders and suppliers. The director of the procuring agency,
however, may avoid compliance with the advertisement requirements
in a number of specific instances.59 If one of those exceptions applies,
entry" is subject to a $10,000 fine or five years imprisonment. The existence of criminal sanctions
emphasizes the importance of the rules of origin. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
55. Id § 2515(c). This report includes recommendations, both legislative and executive, on
necessary improvements and simplifications of administrative practices for government procure-
ment, as well as recommendations to improve foreign procurement of United States' exports. Id
§ 2515(c)(l)-(2).
56. Id § 2516(a)-(b). Exec. Order No. 12,073, 43 Fed. Reg. 36,873 (1978) requires executive
agencies to emphasize government procurement in labor surplus areas. Id § 1-101. The Admin-
istrator of the General Services Administration coordinates this effort and establishes targets for
the executive agencies. Id § -101 to -102. The Secretary of Labor designates those areas as labor
surplus areas. Id § 1-301.
57. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
58. 41 U.S.C. § 252(c) (1976).
59. Id The circumstances that mandate a waiver of the advertisement requirement include a
national emergency, a contract with a value of less than $10,000, a contract involving medicine, a
need for personal or professional services, or an event making the securing of competition imprac-
tical. Id §§ 252(c)(1)-(15). The discretion whether to waive the advertising requirement lies with
the agency head.
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the agency must use a negotiated contract.6 0 If these exceptions do not
apply, the agency must comply with certain requirements. First, the
procuring entity must publish the advertisement sufficiently far in ad-
vance of the date of award of the contract to ensure open competition.6'
Second, the agency must open all bids at the time and place specified in
the advertisement, and award the contract within a reasonable period
of time to the seller who presents the bid most advantageous to the
government.62
Thus, procurement pursuant to this statute demands, with limited
exceptions, that all contracting by the departments and agencies of the
United States government be initiated by advertisement. The Code,
however, allows selective and single tender in rare instances.63 There-
fore, the government procurement statute and the Code direct federal
agencies to procure products differently.'
D. State Procurement Policies
In addition to the federal laws and practices that restrict the importa-
tion of foreign goods and products, most states passed laws that create
a secondary level of non-tariff barriers. A majority of states require
their governmental agencies to provide preferential treatment to local
products when purchasing raw materials, labor or finished goods. 65
60. Id § 254(c) (1976). The single-negotiated tender provides the procuring entity with an
opportunity to enter direct negotiations with a potential seller absent competitive bidding. See
infra notes 137-48 and accompanying text.
61. Id § 253(a).
62. Id § 253(b).
63. See infra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
64. STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE OF THE SENATE COMM. ON FI-
NANCE, 96TH CONG., 1ST SEss., MTN STUDIES, PART 6-3: AGREEMENTS BEING NEGOTIATED AT
THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA-U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMIS-
SION INVESTIGATION No. 332-101, ANALYSIS OF NONTARIFF AGREEMENTS: AGREEMENT ON
GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT 325-29 (Comm. Print 1979) [hereinafter cited as MTN STUDIES],
65. Twenty-eight states have some form of a parochial procurement law. See ALA. CODE
§ 41-16-57(b) (1982) (preference for commodities produced or sold in Alabama if without loss in
quality or price); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 2, § 15.080 (Oct. 1976) (bidder preference; preference
for Alaskan goods repealed in 1976); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-241 to -246 (Supp. 1982-1983)
(political subdivisions of the state must favor bidders who purchase through Arizona dealers or
furnish material produced in state, as long as competing bid is not cheaper than resident bid by
more than five percent, all other things being equal); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 14-294(b) (Supp. 1981)
(public agencies purchasing commodities by competitive bidding must accept lowest bid of an
Arkansas resident if bid is not in excess of five percent of lowest bid of a foreign firm and Arkan-
sas firms made written claim for preference when submitting the bids); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 8-17-
101 to 8-8-103 (1973 & Supp. 1982) (preference for Colorado labor on public works and prefer-
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While the details of these parochial laws vary among the states, their
common purpose remains to protect local labor and industries from
ence for state materials in government contracts); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 255.20 (West 1975) (only
wood grown and finished in Florida may be used in public construction unless insufficient quanti-
ties available); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 40-1903, 40-1920 (1975) (preference for goods produced, manu-
factured or sold in Georgia if without a sacrifice of quality or price); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 103-42
to -46 (1976 & Supp. 1982) (dividing state products into three classes with corresponding percent-
ages of excess allowed over foreign bids while maintaining a preference); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127,
§ 132.6( 1l(a-l) to (a-3(f)) (Smith-Hurd 1981) (preference for domestic bidders over bidder from
any state that gives or requires domestic preference); IOWA CODE ANN. § 73.1-11 (West 1973 &
Supp. 1982-83) (state purchasing agencies must use only products grown and coal produced in
Iowa if available in marketable quanities without sacrificing suitability or cost); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 38:2225, 29:1595 (West Supp. 1983) (preference for food products grown or harvested in
Louisiana and adjoining coastal waters and contracts for public works made with domestic bid-
ders); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 1816(10) (1979 & Supp. 1982) (completely discretionary do-
mestic preference); MD. ANN. CODE art. 21 § 8-301 (1957 & Supp. 1982) (preference when
purchasing supplies for the state and awarding construction contracts - the latter only if the state
of the non-domestic bidder has a preference policy and Maryland firm's bid does not exceed the
low non-domestic bid by more than two percent); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 7, § 22(17) (West
1976) (preference first for Massachusetts goods and supplies, all other things being equal, and
second for goods produced in the United States); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 34.060-.100 (Vernon 1969)
(state purchasing agent must prefer all commodities manufactured, mined, produced or grown in
Missouri and businesses operating as Missouri firms if the product offered is of equal or better
quality and equal or less price); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 18-1-111 to -112 (1981) (forbidding depart-
ment of revenue from showing any partiality in making awards except when price and quality of
goods offered are equal); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 73-101.01-.02 (1981) (providing resident bidder with
preference over non-resident bidder from a state that provides preferences, by a margin equal to
the preference of the other state); NEv. REV. STAT. § 333.300(3) (1979) (preference given to sup-
plier who buys goods from or sells goods through Nevada dealer if the two bids are identical and
furnished by non-resident bidders); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4-5 to -7 (1978) (requiring New Mex-
ico softwood in public buildings and preferring products produced, manufactured or grown in
New Mexico unless authorities feel producers, manufacturers or growers have formed a price-
fixing trust); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-59 (1983) (product preference if no loss in quality or price
and if practicable); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 43-07-20, 48-02-10 (1978) (favoritism for products and
labor from North Dakota in state contracts, with preference given first to honorably discharged
disabled veterans); OR. REV. STAT. § 279.021 (1981) (public contracting agency must prefer goods
or services manufactured or produced in Oregon if equal in price, suitability, availability and
quality); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 37-2-5 (1970) (state purchasing agents must favor food grown in
Rhode Island); S.C. CODE ANN. § 11-35-1520(9)(a-c) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982) (if resident and
non-resident bid are tied, bid goes to South Carolina firm; if bid concerns a commodity produced
in South Carolina and one not produced in state, bid goes to former.); TENN. CODE ANN. § 12-3-
809 (Supp. 1982) (commanding state agencies to give preferential treatment to "meat, meat food
products or meat by-products" produced in Tennessee); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 4601 (Supp. 1982)
(state purchasing director must purchase agricultural products grown or produced in Vermont
when both available and of established quality); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 39.24.010-.040 (1972)
(preference for state purchases of fuel, although a given percent differential factor repealed in
1967); Wyo. STAT. §§ 9-8-302 to -308, 9-8-401 to -406 (1977) (general preference for Wyoming
contractors, labor and materials for state contracts and public works).
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non-resident competition.6 6 Although these laws originally referred to
products only from neighboring states,67 this type of legislation also
constitutes protection against a foreign nation's entry into a state's
markets.6 8
A minority of states enacted buy-national laws that establish a pref-
erence for domestic American goods over foreign products.6 9 Three dif-
ferent classifications of state buy-national laws exist in the United
States.70 The first category, labeled "absolute" laws,7' provides that all
possible purchases are subject to domestic constraints. 72  The second
66. See supra note 65. For example, Illinois, Maryland and Nebraska expressly permit prod-
ucts and labor from another state if that state does not exercise a preference against their goods.
67. The origin of these laws provides proof for this assertion. For example, the Colorado
legislature enacted its law in 1963, Georgia in 1937, Iowa in 1938, Missouri in 1931, Nevada in
1951 and Washington in 1933. Because competition from foreign nations remained relatively
non-existent during this period, state legislatures designed these laws to preclude competition
from other states. Only recently, with the proliferation of foreign competition, have these laws
been capable of being construed to bar competition from foreign countries in addition to that from
other states.
68. For example, Maryland defines a "nonresident firm" as "a business entity that has its
principal office out of State." MD. ANN. CODE art. 21 § 8-301(a)(3) (Supp. 1982). Consequently,
the law requires that the procurement agency favor a Maryland firm over a "nonresident firm" if
the home state of the latter prefers its resident businesses. Id. § 8-301(b)(1). Consequently, "non-
resident" may refer to another state or another country.
69. See Note, FederalLimitations on State "BuyAmerican"Laws, 21 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 177 (1982) (analysis on the constitutional and statutory limitations of state authority to enforce
these laws); Note, State Buy-American Laws - Invaldity of State Attempts to Favor American
Products, 64 MINN. L. REv. 389, 389 (1980) (analyzing the validity of these state laws with respect
to GATT, the Commerce Clause, and federal foreign affairs power and concluding that "state
Buy-Americanism" is invalid under the Commerce Clause and federal foreign affairs power)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Invalidity].
70. Id at 391.
71. Id
72. Three states maintain absolute buy-national laws. Kansas law provides that all contracts
and procurements, the specifications of which are fixed by the director of purchases, may be re-
jected "on the basis that the product is manufactured or assembled outside the United States."
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-3739(5) (Supp. 1982). While this presents only an authorization to reject
foreign goods, it is an authorization to reject all types of foreign goods.
Louisiana law provides that
[a]l bids submitted to any public corporation or political subdivision of the state for
public work shall designate those products manufactured outside the United States of
America to be provided or installed in the execution of such contracts whenever the
aggregate cost to the contractor of such product exceeds fifty thousand dollars and five
percent of the total amount bid for the contract. The use of such products in violation of
the foregoing is hereby prohibited and the contractors shall be liable to the public body
awarding the contract for those penalties which might be provided in the specifications
and in the contract.
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 38:2184.1 (West Supp. 1981).
The language of the Massachusetts absolute statute is vague. It states "[a] preference in the
purchase of supplies and materials, other considerations being equal, in favor, first, of supplies
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group, termed "limited" laws,7 3 endorses a preference for domestic sup-
pliers except when it would be substantially less expensive to purchase
foreign goods or when the goods do not exist in sufficient quantities in
the United States.74 Finally, some states require domestic purchases of
specific products, usually those goods unique to a prevalent industry or
natural resource of the state.7 5 While most states that endorse a buy-
and materials manufactured and sold within the commonwealth [Massachusetts] .... [a]nd
second, of supplies and materials manufactured and sold elsewhere within the United States."
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 7, § 22(17) (Law. Co-op. 1980). Besides providing a preference for
goods made in Massachusetts, see supra note 65 and accompanying text, it favors domestic goods,
qualified only by "other considerations being equal."
73. See Note, Invalidit;, supra note 69, at 391.
74. Four states belong to this "limited" class: Minnesota, New Jersey, Oklahoma and Wis-
consin. Pursuant to MINN. STAr. ANN. § 16.073 (West Supp. 1982), "no materials shall be
purchased by the state for use for governmental purposes which are not manufactured in the
United States .... " Id § 16.073(2). Subsection three provides exceptions if a reasonable quan-
tity is unavailable in the United States, if the domestic price "unreasonably exceeds" the bid of the
foreign supplier, if the quality of a comparably priced foreign good is better than the domestic
product, or if the domestic product is not in the public interest. Id § 16.073(3). This law bears a
close resemblance to the Buy American Act and its exceptions. See supra notes 20-34 and accom-
panying text. Seealso Wampler v. Goldschmidt, 486 F. Supp. 1130 (D. Minn. 1980) (constitution-
ality of Minnesota limited preference law drawn into question but not decided).
The New Jersey statute, although considered a "limited" law, provides fewer exceptions than
the Minnesota law. The statute demands that state agencies procure domestic goods or farm prod-
ucts "whenever available." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:32-1 (West 1955). Although this section
presents the only escape clause in the New Jersey law, as compared to four in the analogous
Minnesota law, the former may authorize a greater sweep of exceptions because of the potentially
expansive meaning of "whenever available." New Jersey also provides a buy-national law for
public works projects, requiring the use of domestic materials except if not produced in the United
States in "commercial quantities and of satisfactory quality." Id § 52:33-2. The New Jersey
statute is unique in requiring government procuring entities purchase only automobiles made in
the United States, unless unreasonable or inconsistent with the public interest. Id § 52:32-1.1
(West Supp. 1982-83). See infra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
According to Oklahoma law, all governmental agencies must purchase "goods and equipment
manufactured or produced in the United States of America, unless a foreign made product is
substantially cheaper and of equal quality, or is of substantially superior quality to competing
American products and is sold at a comparable price." OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 51 (West
1963). This statute effectively reduces foreign imports for governmental use by placing generally
unattainable qualifications on the foreign product.
The Wisconsin "limited law" provides that state agencies shall purchase materials and products
"when all other factors are substantially equal" and only when the industries manufacture the
products to the greatest extent in the United States. Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 16.754(2) (West Supp.
1982-83). This language resembles the "substantially all" requirement of the Buy American Act.
See supra notes 20-34 and accompanying text. The Wisconsin legislature mitigated the severity of
this constraint by providing that it ceased to apply if there were insufficient quantities or if the
quality of the domestic good were inferior. Id §§ 16.754(3)(a)-(b). See supra note 25 and accom-
panying text (discussing "substantially all" requirement of Buy American Act).
75. See Note, Invaliditj supra note 69, at 391.
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national law opted for this latter type,76 some states use a buy-national
76. Those states are California, Colorado, Indiana, Mississippi, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, Texas, Virgina and West Virginia.
California specifically excludes certain equipment. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 4300-05 (Deering
1982). These products include scientific and medical equipment, sewing machines, and certain
types of printing presses. Id §§ 4302-02.6. California also applies a buy-national policy to public
works. 1d § 4304. See infra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
The "specific" state buy-national law in Colorado mandates that the state agencies prefer fresh
and frozen meats as well as dairy products from the United States. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 8-18-101
(Supp. 1982). This national preference exists in addition to a state parochial preference. See
supra note 65 and accompanying text; infra note 77 and accompanying text.
Indiana provides that favoritism by state governments will be shown only to suppliers of domes-
tic steel. IND. CODE ANN. § 5-16-8-2(a) (Bums 1983). This provision may be waived if the cost of
domestic steel is unreasonable, or if there is an inadequate domestic supply. Id The statute
contains a value-added differential provision similar to that found in the Buy American Act.
Under this system, a domestic steel bid is not unreasonable if it does not exceed the foreign bid by
fifteen percent (15%). Id §§ 5-16-8-2(b)(1) - (b)(2). The fifteen percent differential becomes
twenty-five percent (25%) if the bid comes from an Indiana firm, thereby attempting to protect
further state employment. Id § 5-16-8-2(b).
Mississippi endorses a preference for beef produced in the United States. MISS. CODE ANN,
§§ 31-7-61 to -65 (Supp. 1982). In addition, the statute provides penalties of up to thirty (30) days
injail or a fine of $100-500. Id § 31-7-63. The statute is violated only if an individualknoipngl,
purchases foreign beef. Id § 31-7-61.
Ohio, like Indiana, prefers only domestic steel producers in projects wholly or partially sup-
ported by the state. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 153.011 (Page Supp. 1982).
Pennsylvania enacted the Steel Products Procurement Act to require commonwealth agencies to
procure domestic steel when needed. PA. STAT. ANN. tit 73, §§ 1881-1887 (Purdon Supp. 1982).
This statute is one of the few that sets forth the public policy reasons for state buy-national legisla-
tion. Id § 1883. These considerations include the preservation of employment, the use of steel
sales to increase state revenues, the expansion of the industry, and the preservation of general
welfare and national security. Id Finally, the Pennsylvania legislature intended this legislation
to be remedial and to receive a liberal construction. Id § 1887.
Rhode Island, like Pennsylvania, enacted a Steel Products Procurement Act. R.I. GEN. LAws
§§ 37-2.1-1 to -5 (Supp. 1982). The legislature designed the Act "to be an exercise of the police
powers of the state for the protection of the health, safety and general welfare of the people of the
state." Id § 37-2.1-2. Accordingly, the law provides that all public state agencies shall use steel
produced in the United States unless such steel fails to be readily available or if the domestic cost
exceeds the foreign cost by fifteen percent (15%). Id § 37-2.1-3. The legislature reasoned that
because the United States was a world leader in a steel industry that employed millions of taxpay-
ers, the state could aid in the development and expansion of the industry. Id § 37-2.1-2.
The South Dakota buy-national law prohibits the purchase of imported beef with public funds,
except when canned meat products are domestically unavailable. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 5-
19-1.1 (1969). Violation of this statute is a "Class 2 misdemeanor." Id
The "specific" state government buy-national law in Texas requires that all "dairy products"
purchased by state agencies be of American origin. TEx. STAT. ANN. art. 4476-6b (Vernon 1976).
The legislature defined a dairy product as "milk, cream, butter, cheese or any product consisting
largely of one or more of them." Id § 4476-6a.
The state procuring entities of Virginia prefer domestic steel in "every contract and subcontract
in an amount of fifty thousand dollars or more for construction, reconstruction, alteration, repair,
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law in conjunction with a parochial law77 or use no preference law at
all.7 8
The constitutionality of these state buy-national laws in the face of
international agreements such as GATT and the MTN remains incon-
clusive. In Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. Superior Court,79 a Cali-
fornia appellate court relying on the federal government's power to
enter treaties pursuant to Article VI of the Constitution ° held that
GATT superceded the California buy-national law.8" Several years
improvement or maintenance of any public works .... " VA. CODE § 11-23.7 (Supp. 1982). As
with similar laws, the Virginia legislature placed restrictions on this law. The state government
could use domestic steel only if the cost does not exceed the foreign steel by more than ten percent
(1017), id § 11-23.7(B), and if it exists in the United States in sufficient quantities. Id § 11-
23.7(A).
Finally, West Virginia law resembles the laws of Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Virgina. The
statute requires that if a state project is at issue or state funds are being used, steel, aluminum and
glass must be supplied by domestic firms. W. VA. CODE § 5-19-1 to -4 (1979 & Supp. 1982). If
insufficient quantities exist or if the purchase is inconsistent with the public interest, however, the
foreign bid will be accepted. Id § 5-19-2(a). Like the Indiana and Virginia laws, the West Vir-
ginia statute applies a value-added differential to the foreign bid. If the domestic bid exceeds the
foreign bid by twenty percent (20%), the foreign supplier will be awarded the contract. Id. § 5-19-
2(b).
77. Four states use a parochial law and some type of buy-national law in tandem. Colorado
and Rhode Island chose a parochial law and a specific law, while Louisiana and Massachusetts
use a parochial law in conjunction with an absolute law. See supra notes 65, 72 & 75.
78. Eight states do not endorse trade protectionism: Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Ken-
tucky, Michigan, New Hampshire, New York and Utah. Of these, Kentucky and Utah adopted
Model Procurement Acts. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45A.005-.990 (Bobbs-Merrill 1980 & Supp.
1982), and UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-56-I to -64 (Supp. 1981).
79. 208 Cal. App. 2d 803, 25 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1962).
80. Id at 819-20, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 809. Article VI of the Constitution states that treaties made
pursuant to the authority of the federal government are the supreme law of the land. The Califor-
nia law remains unenforceable because it does not afford like treatment to foreign and domestic
suppliers as required by GATT. Id at 818-19, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 808-09. For the text of the Califor-
nia law, see supra note 76.
The decision in Baldwin that GATT supercedes state law has not been uniformly followed. In
Territory v. Ho, 41 Hawaii 565 (1957), reasoning similar to Baldwin was evident in the court's
decision that a state law was unconstitutional because it conflicted with GATT. Id at 571. The
court in Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Comm'rs, 276 Cal. App. 2d 221, 80 Cal. Rptr. 800
(1969), see text accompanying infra note 82, failed to follow the reasoning of Baldwin and Ho, and
noted the distinction between the Baldwin court's use of "superceded" and the Ho court's use of
"unconstitutional" and "conflicted." 276 Cal. App. 2d at 227 n.9, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 804 n.9. This
distinction may not be blatant, yet it remains significant; "superceded" connotes obsolescence,
whereas "conflicted" and "unconstitutional" connote a previous error that needed a remedy.
81. 208 Cal. App. 2d at 819, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 809. Originally, GATT did not pertain to
government procurement because of the exemption in article III paragraph 8. See infra note 113.
Products at issue in this case, turbines and other electrical equipment, generate electricity. The
laldwin court reasoned that the electrical power produced by the turbines and other electrical
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later, the same court considered the same law in Bethlehem Steel Corp.
v. Board of Commissioners2 and found it unconstitutionally en-
croached on the power of the federal government to engage in interna-
tional relations.8 3 The court reasoned that foreign trade is a federal
concern and that the operation of the state law created too great an
opportunity for potential conflict.8 4 By avoiding the issue of whether
the state law conflicted with GATT, the Bethlehem Steel court found it
unnecessary to resolve the apparent conflict with Baldwin."
Some jurisdictions, on the other hand, have held that state laws may
co-exist with international trade agreements. In K.S.B. Technical Sales
Corp. v. North Jersey District Water Commission, 6 the Supreme Court
of New Jersey decided that the state buy-national law 7 does not inter-
fere with the federal commerce clause"8 or with the federal govern-
ment's power to conduct foreign affairs.8 9  While the court
acknowledged that the Constitution places stringent restrictions on
state actions concerning foreign affairs, 90 the court focused its attention
on the fact that the New Jersey buy-national law does not authorize
judgments about, or discriminate among, the countries barred from im-
portation because of their prevailng political ideologies.9' The court
upheld this state practice because it conformed with the Buy American
Act that also does not condition national government procurement on
equipment will be resold, thus constituting an exception to the article III paragraph 8 exception.
208 Cal. App. 2d at 819, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 809.
82. 276 Cal. App. 2d 221, 80 Cal. Rptr. 800 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969).
83. Id at 224, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 802.
84. Id at 226, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 803. The court reinforced its findings by claiming that foreign
trade is a national concern, that international trade is the basis of foreign relations, and that any
one state's activity cannot be allowed to defeat these national objectives. Id at 226-27, 80 Cal.
Rptr. at 803.
85. Id at 227 n.9, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 804 n.9. Bethelehem Steel remains the only decision to rest
on the federal government's supremacy in foreign affairs.
86. 75 N.J. 272, 381 A.2d 774, rev'd on other grounds, 151 N.J. Super. 218, 376 A.2d 960
(1977), appeal dismissed 435 U.S. 982 (1978).
87. See supra note 74.
88. 75 N.J. at 300, 381 A.2d at 778. The court reasoned that the state buy-national law did
not violate the commerce clause according to the Supreme Court opinion in Hughes v. Alexander
Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976). Justice Powell in4exander Scrap concluded that "[n]othing in
the purposes animating the Commerce Clause forbids a State, in the absence of congressional
action, from participating in the market and exercising the right to favor its own citizens over
others." Id at 810.
89. 75 N.J. at 292, 381 A.2d at 784.
90. Id at 290, 381 A.2d at 783.
91. Id at 291, 381 A.2d at 783.
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the ideological tenor of foreign nations.92
These cases illustrate the confusion among state courts with regard to
the constitutionality of state buy-national laws. The paucity of litiga-
tion on these state laws illustrates their minor impact. Although the
Constitution established the federal government's preeminence over
the states in foreign affairs,93 buy-local laws may overcome constitu-
tional infirmities as states exercise their police power to protect their
unique resources. 94 Alternatively, the state buy-national laws present
significantly less compelling justifications.
E. Government Procurement in Japan
Before Japan became a signatory nation to the Government Procure-
ment Code, its procurement practices were extremely restrictive.95 Ja-
pan failed to accept open procurement practices, similar to those used
in the United States, for a number of reasons. First, while the Japanese
92. Id at 291-92, 381 A.2d at 784.
93. This issue transcends the scope of this Note. See generally L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AND THE CONSTITUTION 227-48 (1972) (exhaustive treatment of state involvement in foreign af-
fairs). At times, however, a state regulation withstands a constitutional challenge that it violates
the commerce clause and therefore does not interfere with the federal government's power to
engage in foreign affairs. Compare Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 453-
54 (1979) (California ad valorem tax on cargo containers of a Japanese shipping company "pre-
vent[ed] the Federal Government from 'speaking with one voice' in international trade" and
therefore was inconsistent with the congressional power to regulate foreign commerce) and
Tupman Thurlow Co. v. Moss, 252 F. Supp. 641,645 (M.D. Tenn. 1966) (Tennessee labelling and
licensing laws imposed discriminatory restrictions and burdens on interstate and foreign com-
merce) and Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Comm'rs, 276 Cal. App. 2d 221, 225, 87 Cal. Rptr.
800, 803 (1969) (California Buy American Act usurped the power of the federal government to
implement international trade policy) with Department of Revenue v. Association of Washington
Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 754 (1978) (Washington business and occupation tax on stevedor-
ing did not interfere with the federal government's ability to conduct foreign policy) and Ray v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 179-80 (1978) (Washington tugboat design statute did not
violate the commerce clause because it was an indirect regulation and it did not violate the federal
government's power to conduct foreign affairs) and Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276,
285-86 (1976) (the federal government's sole power to impose duties rests on the premises that the
federal government "must speak with one voice when regulating commercial relations with for-
eign governments," that import taxes constitute a profitable source of revenue, and that harmony
among the states would be promoted; the Georgia tax was nondiscriminatory and had no impact
on federal regulation of foreign commerce) and Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. Environmental Im-
provement Comm'n, 307 A.2d 1, 46-47 (Me. 1973) (Maine law governing transfers of oil over
water not invalid as an encroachment on the federal government's power to conduct foreign af-
fairs and enter treaties).
94. See, e.g., supra note 76 (justifications for Pennsylvania buy local law).
95. TASK FORCE, supra note 5, at 31.
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claimed that the government used public automatic tender,96 selective
automatic tender and private contract,97 in reality the Japanese relied
almost exclusively on the latter two methods of tender.98 Second, no
central procurement agency existed in Japan.9 9 As a consequence,
purchasing authority remained at the local level. Procurement deci-
sions were subject to parochial concerns that favored local suppliers,
which rendered government procurers inaccessible to foreign suppli-
ers."°  Third, American business failed to establish immediately
branch offices in Japan, t10 further aggravating the effects of limited do-
mestic suppliers and the lack of a central purchasing agency. Fourth,
Japan restricted the sources in which they published requests for
bids. 02 As a result, few businesses had access to government procure-
ment. Fifth, in 1963 a Buy Japan Cabinet order, similar to the Buy
American Act, forced Japanese government procuring entities to favor
96. See infra note 97 and accompanying text.
97. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, GOVERNMENT
PURCHASING REGULATIONS AND PROCEDURES OF OECD MEMBER COUNTRIES 6-7 (1976) [here-
inafter cited as GOVERNMENT PURCHASING]. Public automatic tender is an open procedure in
which an unlimited number of suppliers have access to the contract. The contract relies on simple
criteria, such as price, to determine who will be awarded the contract. Id Selective automatic
tender is the same as public automatic tender except that the procuring entity limits the number of
suppliers. Id In the private contract procedure, the purchaser and supplier negotiate the con-
tract, irrespective of the predetermined conditions and requirements. Id at 6. See infra note 141.
98. Impact of Non-TariffBarriers on the Ability of Small Business to Export to Japan: Hear-
ings Before the Senate Select Comm. on Small Business, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as Impact]. The Senate Select Committee on Small Business estimated that the Japanese
government accomplished 90 percent of its procuring by using the private contract. Id See supra
note 97.
99. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GOVERNMENTAL BuY-NATIONAL PRACTICES OF THE
UNITED STATES AND OTHER COUNTRIES - AN ASSESSMENT 49 (1976) (copy on file in "Readex" at
the Thomas Jefferson Library, University of Missouri - Saint Louis) [hereinafter cited as BUY-
NATIONAL PRACTICES]. This study is the most comprehensive source of pre-Code Japanese pro-
curement law and practices.
100. TASK FORCE, supra note 5, at 31.
101. BuY-NATIONAL PRACTICES, supra note 99, at 52.
102. ISSUES AND PROBLEMS, supra note 3, at 74-75. See generally GOVERNMENT PURCHAS-
ING, supra note 97, at 67-68 (listing the requirements for notice of each method of Japanese pro-
curement). See supra note 97 and accompanying text. One may wonder why public automatic
tender was so ineffective. Part of the answer lies in the notification procedure. For private auto-
matic tender prior to the Code, the government required the procuring entity to publish notice of
solicitation of bids ten days in advance of the due date and only five days if the purchases were
urgent. GOVERNMENT PURCHASING, supra note 97, at 66-67. If the required purchases are large
or complicated, not only are most domestic Japanese firms precluded from bidding, but this proce-
dure acts as a significant NTB by precluding foreign competition. This example illustrates an area
in which the MTN Code had a significant impact because it extended such deadlines.
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domestic suppliers. Unlike the unlimited application of its American
counterpart, however, it pertained only to fourteen commodity
groups.'0 3 Thus, this order further entrenched the first four practices.
These five factors effectively barred foreign access to potentially large-
volume markets.
The procurement policies in Japan changed gradually, culminating
in the adoption of the MTN Code. In September 1972, the Japanese
government rescinded the Buy Japan Cabinet Order of 1963.'1 In De-
cember 1975, the Japanese government removed the restrictions on im-
portation of computers and electronic devices.' In 1978, Japan
announced that it would engage in "unilateral efforts" to ease restric-
tions on government procurement.' 06 Finally, in 1979, Japan furthered
this goal by signing the MTN Code.'0 7
F Conclusions Regarding Government Procurement
American and Japanese procurement policies represent opposite
views. The United States has an open procurement policy; the Japa-
nese employ a closed procurement policy. Three fundamental distinc-
tions exist between the procurement policy of the United States and
that of Japan. First, the United States possesses a centralized federal
statutory protectionist policy-the Buy American Act. 108 Although Ja-
pan used a Buy Japanese policy until 1972, it relies more heavily on
numerous implied parochial policies to control government
procurement.
Second, both countries employ substantially different methods of bid
103. Impact, supra note 98, at 61. Although sovereign buy-national laws such as the Buy
American Act, see supra notes 20-34 and accompanying text, restrict access to government pro-
curement, at the very least the foreign nation knows the barrier it must overcome. The Japanese
barriers are diffuse and not codified, thereby forcing suppliers into the morass of local government
bureaucracy. See supra notes 93-102 and accompanying text. See also BuY-NATIONAL PRAC-
TICES, supra note 99 at 50.
104, BuY-NATIONAL PRACTICES, supra note 99, at 50.
105. Id This delay in easing import restrictions on computers and electronics provides a clas-
sic example of the infant industry approach. See supra note 3. As a consequence, until 1975 the
Japanese computer, semiconductor and electronic industries grew unhindered by foreign competi-
tion. By 1975 the Japanese industries matured sufficiently to withstand foreign competition. Only
then was the Japanese market "opened." See supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text.
106. TASK FORCE, supra note 5, at 31.
107. Annex I of the MTN Government Procurement Code indicated that Japan became a
signatory to the Code and lists those Japanese agencies that must purchase pursuant to the Code.
See infra note 113.
108. See supra notes 20-34 and accompanying text.
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tender. 0 9 Through open and public automatic tender, the United
States maximizes the number of suppliers and the ability to choose the
product that best satisfies its needs. Japan, by using private negotiated
tender, achieves a significant degree of control over its suppliers. Be-
cause of its open tender policy, the United States attempts to provide
adequate notice and sufficient time for suppliers to respond to bids.
Japan, by choosing the negotiated tender, need not provide notice nor
an adequate response time.
State procurement policies in the United Staes present the third ma-
jor difference between government procurement in the United States
and Japan.I0 While not regulated by the Code, the state buy-national
laws pose a secondary barrier to foreign trade with regard to specific
products. No formal secondary restrictive level exists in Japan.
This section illustrates the complexity and diverse nature of procure-
ment laws and practices in the United States and Japan. Such an envi-
ronment contributed to trade stagnation and tense relations between
the countries. The United States and Japan, among other nations, at-
tempted to standardize and clarify government procurement by adopt-
ing the MTN Code.
II. THE MTN GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT CODE
The Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN), which concluded in
April 1979, resulted from a meeting held pursuant to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), a multilateral trade agree-
ment."' Pursuant to GATT, the signatory nations agreed to subse-
quent meetings or "rounds" to facilitate more responsive trade
109. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
I10. See supra notes 65-92 and accompanying text.
111. 61 Stat. A5, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, reprinted in 4 Bevans 639 (1970) [herein-
after cited as GATT]. GATT negotiations concluded in Geneva, Switzerland on October 30,
1947. The text of GATT is reprinted in J. JACKSON, DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT TO LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 1-72 (1977). All citations to GATT's arti-
cles and sections will be to this edition.
The drafters of GATT designed it to provide not only for the reduction of import tariffs and
trade barriers but also for the elimination of trade preferences. GATT, supra, art. I, 1 1. Simply,
the agreement attempts to restrict and eliminate tariff barriers, including restrictions on the
amount of goods to be imported and tariffs placed upon imported goods, MTN STUDIES, supra
note 64, at 201. During the 1947 negotiations, a disagreement arose concerning the use of the
word "goods." The result is in annex I to the GATT in which goods were "limited to products as
understood in commercial practice, and is not intended to include the purchase or sale of serv-
ices." GATT, supra, at annex I (as an addition to Art. XVII 2).
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negotiations through continued discussion and analysis."l 2 Both na-
tions acceded to the MTN at the seventh, Tokyo Round."I3 The MTN
contains many trade agreements or "Codes,""' 4 one of which is the
Government Procurement Code (Code).
Certain exceptions, or escape clauses, to GATT led to the recogni-
tion of a need for a government procurement code. First, article 111(8)
provides that GATT shall not apply to government procurement by
various "agencies. I""' Second, article XXI(b) states that nothing in
GATT shall be interpreted in a manner that would compromise a na-
112. G. CURZON, MULTILATERAL COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY, THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON
TARIFFS AND TRADE AND ITS IMPACT ON NATIONAL COMMERCIAL POLICIES AND TECHNIQUES
87-107 (1965). The prior six rounds were, Kennedy Round (1962), Dillon Round (1958), Geneva
Round (1956), Torquay Round (1951), Annecy Round (1949), and the original GATT in Geneva
in 1947. Id at 81. The time between the Kennedy and the Tokyo Rounds witnessed a significant
change in the relative economic strengths of the major economic powers. A. LONG, DIRECTOR
GENERAL OF GATT, THE TOKYO ROUND OF THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 1 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as TOKYO ROUND]. Europe became the largest trading entity, and the United
States and Japan constituted the top economic powers. Id The content of the MTN is the result
of the efforts of these three entities. Id
113. Multilateral Trade Agreements." Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Af-
fairs. 96th Cong. 1st Sess. 130 (1979) [hereinafter cited as MTA Hearing]. This Note uses the
second revised draft of the Code reprinted in MTA Hearing and dated April 11, 1979 -
MTN/NTM/W/21 /Rev. 2. The first revised draft is available in INTERNATIONAL CODES, supra
note 7, at 129. The date of this version is April 5, 1979 - MTN/NTM/W/21 1/Rev. 1. The sub-
group on government procurement accepted both revisions. Citation to the Code in this Note will
be to GOVT. PROC. CODE and the applicable part and paragraph.
114. A difference of opinion exists between commentators and the federal government on the
manner in which the sections of the Code should be labeled. The government refers to the sec-
tions as "parts." See INTERNATIONAL CODES, supra note 7, at 120; MTA Hearing, supra note 113,
at 219-376; STAFF OF THE SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 96TH CONG., 1ST SESS., AGREEMENTS
NEGOTIATED UNDER SECTION 102 OF THE TRADE ACT OF 1974 IN THE MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS: SUBMITTED ON JUNE 19, 1979, FOR APPROVAL BY CONGRESS 65 (Comm. Print
1979). Commentators, however, refer to the sections as "articles." See Anthony & Hagerty, Cau-
tious Optimism as a Guide to Foreign Government Procurement, 11 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 1301
(1979); Note, United Staes - Japan Trade Developments Under the MTNAgreement on Government
Procurement, 5 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 139, 141 n.7 (1982); Recent Development, International
Trade.- Government Procurement of Telecommunications Equipment, 22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 464, 466
n.13 (1981).
This Note uses that label preferred by the drafters, "parts."
115. Article III, 8 of GATT provides:
(a) The provisions of this Article shall not apply to laws, regulations or requirements
governing the procurement by governmental agencies of products purchased for govern-
mental purposes and not with a view to commercial resale or with a view to use in the
production of goods for commercial sale.
(b) The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the payment of subsidies exclu-
sively to domestic producers, including payments to domestic producers derived from
the proceeds of internal taxes or charges applied consistently with the provisions of this
Article and subsidies affected through governmental purchases of domestic products.
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tion's security.'" 6 These two provisions, known as non-tariff barriers
(NTBs)," 17 effectively foreclose international competition in defense
oriented procurement. In light of this difference between the imposi-
tion of some trade barriers under GATT and the lack of regulation of
government procurement, the signatory nations, including the United
States," 8 decided to address government procurement at the Tokyo
Round of the MTN.' 9
GATT, supra note 111, art. III, 18. This article provides for legislation such as the United States'
Buy American Act. See supra notes 20-34 and accompanying text.
Interpretive disagreements arose over the meaning of "governmental agencies" in article III 8.
The draftsmen decided that this meant "all governmental bodies including local authorities."
MTN STUDIES, supra note 64, at 207. Also, article XXIV, 12 of GATT states that "[e]ach con-
tracting party shall take such reasonable measures as maybe available to it to ensure observance of
the provisions of this Agreement by the regional and local governments and authorities within its
territory." GATT, supra note 11, art. XXIV 12. This definition is important in light of the
federal Buy American Act and numerous state buy-local laws. See supra notes 65-92 and accom-
panying text.
116. GATT, supra note 111, art. XXI(b).
117. NTBs are discussed at length in R. BALDWIN, NONTARiFF DISTORTIONS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE (1970). Baldwin asserts that nontariff trade distortions include export subsidies
and government aids. Id at 2 n.4 Baldwin defines nontariff trade distortions as:
any measure (public or private) that causes internationally traded goods and services, or
resources devoted to the production of these goods and services, to be allocated in such a
way as to reduce potential real world income. Potential real world income is that level
attainable if resources and outputs are allocated in an economically efficient manner.
Id at 5.
118. Pursuant to the Trade Act of 1974, the United States possessed the authority to enter
negotiations for the MTN, and subsequently, the Code. 19 U.S.C. § 2112 (1982). In § 2112(a),
Congress concluded that barriers to international trade existed and that the barriers narrowed the
availability of foreign markets for domestic industry. As a result, Congress authorized the Presi-
dent "to take all appropriate and feasible steps within his power . . . to harmonize, reduce, or
eliminate such barriers to (and other distortions of) international trade." Id.
Part IX of the Code outlines the procedural steps to enact the Code into law in the signatory
nations. GovT. PROC. CODE, supra note 113, part IX, para. 3-4. Because the Code prohibits
reservations, id. part IX, para. 2, these nations must accept all or none of the provisions. The
drafters of the Code realized the impermanent nature of international trade, however, and pro-
vided procedures for review of the implementation of the Code, id. part IX, para. 6(a), and for the
renewal of negotiations to broaden its scope. Id. part IX, para. 6(b). The drafters further pro-
vided that, upon reasonable notice, the signatory nations may amend annexes I-IV, 1d. part IX,
para. 5(a), or withdraw their support. Id. part IX, para. 8.
119. MTN STUDIES, supra note 64, at 201. Although the government procurement did not
become a topic for negotiation at the Tokyo Round until July, 1976, the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD), an international organization established pursu-
ant to the Convention on the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 12
U.S.T. 1728, T.I.A.S. No. 4891 (U.N.T.S.), extensively researched procurement prior to the MTN.
See TOKYO ROUND, supra note 112, at 76-77. Because government procurement policies notice-
ably lacked regulation and were discriminatory, both developed and lesser developed countries
agreed upon the necessity ofregulation. Id The OECD drafted a document, "Draft Instrument
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The preamble asserts that the purposes of the MTN include reducing
and eliminating non-tariff barriers and their effects,' 20 aiding the devel-
opment of least developed countries whose position may be improved
by adherence to the Code,' 2 ' and clarifying methods of international
notification so that Code provisions may be effectively enforced.' 22 Al-
though the preamble remains largely hortatory,123 it attempts to ensure
the "transparency of laws." 124
Generally, the Code applies to any purchase of products by the enti-
ties 25 of signatory nations. It does not apply to the purchase of serv-
ices.' 26  The procuring entities must remain "under the direct or
on Government Purchasing Policies, Procedures and Practices," that the signatory nations of
GATT used as a basis for research on government procurement during the Tokyo Round. Id at
76.
120. GovT. PROC. CODE, supra note 113, at preamble, para. 1.
121. Id preamble, para. 2, 4.
122. Id preamble, para. 8.
123. MTN STUDIES, supra note 64, at 218-19. In this regard the preamble remains clear be-
cause it outlines no obligations. Id
124. GovT. PROC. CODE, supra note 113, at preamble, para. 7. This provision provokes much
discussion. See supra note 6. It appears, however, that the drafters based "transparency" on
American procurement law by embodying "some notions of due process and equal competitive
opportunities." MTN STUDIES, supra note 64, at 219. Accordingly, "transparency" is "the consis-
tent and regular application of laws, regulations, practices, and procedures which are fully publi-
cized or otherwise freely available to interested persons." Id
125. See GOVT. PROC. CODE, supra note 113, part I, para. 1. In a footnote to this provision,
the drafters of the Code make it clear that "entities" includes agencies. Id at n.l. A question
arises as to whether this means solely federal agencies or whether it means federal and state agen-
cies. A similar problem developed with the interpretation of "government agencies" in article III,
8, of the GATT, and commentators defined the term to include state and local agencies. See
supra note 115 and accompanying text. If the Code adopted that interpretation, however, serious
federalism problems would develop between the Code and various state government procurement
policies. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
126. MTN STUDIES, supra note 64, at 221. The drafters of the Code realized that some serv-
ices had to be included, because there are times when the service is incidental to the product. See
supra note 34. In this regard, service that does not exceed the cost of the product is part of that
product, thereby regulated by the Code. GovT. PROC. CODE, supra note 113, part I, para. l(a). In
part IX paragraph 6(b), the drafters of the Code recognized that this limitation places too narrow
a scope on the Code and provided that within three years the signatory nations should negotiate to
expand the scope of the Code to include service contracts. Id. part IX, para. 6(b).
The drafters placed a second limitation on the coverage of the Code by exempting purchases
below a value of $150,000 special drawing rights (SDRs). Id part I, para. 1(b). The drafters felt,
however, that this value unduly restricted the scope of the Code, which had to remain flexible.
The result was the inclusion of an exculpatory clause in which the trade committee "shall review
annually the implementation and operation of this Agreement taking into account the objectives
thereof." Id part, IX para. 6(a). Specifically, the Code provides that the SDR limitation may be
lowered pursuant to part IX, paragraph 6(a), enabling more contracts to come under the purview
of the Code. Id part I, para 1(c) n.2. The drafters engaged in extensive negotiations concerning
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substantial control" of the nations. 127 Although the Code impliedly
covers not only federal agencies but also state agencies, the United
States presently includes no state agencies in its list of agencies affected,
thereby partially resolving federalism problems.128
The Code also attempts to eliminate discrimination in the importa-
tion of goods. To achieve this goal, the Code requires not only that
signatory nations refrain from favoring domestic suppliers over foreign
producers, 129 but also that government procurement agencies treat all
foreign suppliers equally.13 0 While this non-discriminatory mandate at-
tempts to bring all developed nations under the Code, in actuality the
developed nations afford preferential treatment to the developing na-
tions.13 ' This provision for preferential treatment contravenes the
the value of the SDR limit. The threshold could not be too low for fear of causing too large an
administrative burden, TOKYO ROUND, supra note 112, at 78, but if the SDR limit were high, the
purpose and intent of the Code would be frustrated. Id Thus, it appears as though the 150,000
SDR represented a compromise.
An SDR is an international monetary reserve asset used to supplement gold when the need
arises. Gold, A Comparison of Special Drawing Iights and Gold as Reserve Assets, 2 LAW & POL'Y
IN INT'L Bus. 326, 331 (1970). The SDR grew as a consequence of the development of a stable
international financial system by the International Monetary Fund. Id The SDR remains useful
because, like gold, it does not change as the value of currency fluctuates. ld at 341.
In 1979, a 150,000 SDR was worth approximately $193,500. MTN STUDIEs, supra note 64, at
222. In 1982, the United States Trade Representative lowered the ceiling to $182,000, thereby
enhancing the effectiveness of the Code. Purchases Under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 47
Fed. Reg. 6021 (1982) (codified at 41 C.F.R. § I-6.1601(e)).
127. GovT. PROC. CODE, supra note 113, part I, para 1(c). The signatory nations submitted
lists of the agencies to be covered by the Code to the trade committee, listed in annex I of the
Code. Id In addition, the Code authorizes the signatories to notify those agencies not covered by
the Code "of the objectives, principles and rules of this Agreement [Code], in particular the rules
on national treatment and non-discrimination," and to educate those agencies on the benefit of the
Code. Id part I, para. 2.
128. Annex I of the Code, that lists the agencies affected, resolves the federalism problem for
the present. It remains clear, moreover, that annex I pursuant to part I paragraph 1(c) exists as the
sole determinant of entities to be covered by the Code. MTN STUDIES, supra note 64, at 226. A
strict construction of part I, paragraph 2 of the Code averts future conflict because "fp]arties shall
inform their entities not covered by this Agreement and the regional and local governments and
authorities within their territories. . ." GovT. PROC. CODE, supra note 113, part I, para. 2 (em-
phasis added). Commentators and the government interpret this as meaning that the Code does
not apply to regional and local governments. MTN STUDIES, supra note 64 at 246.
129. GovT. PROC. CODE, supra note 113, part II, para. l(a).
130. Id part II, para. l(b).
131. Id part III, para. 1. This paragraph states:
Parties to this Agreement shall, in the implementation and administration of this Agree-
ment, through the provisions set out in this Part, duly take into account the development,
financial and trade needs of developing countries, in particular the least developed coun-
tries, in their need to:
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wholly non-discriminatory nature of the Code.1 32 Finally, in order to
prevent non-signatory nations from benefitting from the Code, para-
graph three prohibits the procuring of products that originate in non-
member nations but travel through a signatory nation to the procuring
government. 133
In an attempt to standardize government procurement, the drafters
provided technical specifications for government procurement.1 34  To
discourage signatory nations from using such specifications as signifi-
cant non-tariff barriers,' 35 the article not only states that participating
nations shall not prepare or use specifications to create barriers to inter-
national trade, 36 but also provides that technical specifications, when
appropriate, shall be based on performance rather than design.137
(a) safeguard their balance-of-payments position and ensure a level of reserves
adequate for the implementation of programmes of economic development;
(b) promote the establishment or development of domestic industries. .
(c) support industrial units so long as they are wholly or substantially dependent
on government procurement;
(d) encourage their economic development through regional or global arrange-
ments ....
Id (emphasis added).
132. MTN STUDIES, supra note 64, at 250. This nondiscriminatory posture among signatory
nations for government procurement is, by necessity, contradictary to the GATT most favored
nation (MFN) clause in article I. GATT, supra note 111, art. I. A MFN clause is inherently
discriminatory because it favors one nation over another. Part II of the Code, however, includes a
"conditional" MRN clause that accords such status to non-signatory nations conditioned on their
acceptance of the Code. MTN STUDIES, supra note 64, at 250.
133. GovT. PROC. CODE, supra note 113, part II, para. 3. Without any regulation of "trans-
shipping," the conditional MFN treatment among signatory nations for government procurement
would be useless. MTN STUDIES, supra note 64, at 255.
134. GovT. PROC. CODE, supra note 113, part IV, para. (a).
135. MTN STUDIES, supra note 64, at 297. The Japenese importation of autos presents one
area in which technical specifications function as an effective NTB. See ISSUES AND PROBLEMS,
supra note 3, at 54-55. For exported cars to be accepted as imports by the Japanese Ministry of
Transport, modifications must be made. Id at 51. Not only do these specifications and changes
deter American manufacturers from selling in Japan, but such specifications are costly and par-
tially responsible for the significant price difference between American imports and a comparable
Japanese car. Id at 46.
136. GovT. PROC. CODE, supra note 113, part IV, para. (a). Paragraph (a) states that
"[tiechnical specifications ... shall not be prepared, adopted or applied with a view to creating
obstacles to international trade nor have the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to interna-
tional trade." Id This paragraph would appear to be directed against intentionally erected barri-
ers. If, however, a barrier were unintentionally created, it may remain as long as it is necessary.
MTN STUDIES, supra note 64, at 298.
137. GovT. PROC. CODE, supra note 113, part IV, para. (b)(i). Americans prefer performance
rather than design as the standard of Japanese automobile import restrictions. The Economic
Relations Group, see supra note 5, acknowledges that this is a recurring problem. Wisn MEN'S
REPORT, supra note 5, at 60. The group observed that the importation of a product may be disap-
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They also must reflect national and international standards rather than
local standards. 38
In addition to providing technical specifications, the Code outlines in
detail methods of tender for government procurement. Because the
integral policy of the Code rests on nondiscrimination and trans-
parency,1 39 the drafters of the Code designed the tendering process to
reflect these principles. 140 The Code mandates three methods of
tender: open, selective and single.' 4 ' The Code qualifies the use of
proved on the basis of design, even though the performance standards are similar to the compara-
ble Japanese product. Id Establishing functional specifications or preferring performance to
design is a prominent trend in the United States' government procurement practices. MTN STUD-
iEs, supra note 64, at 299. The use of functional specifications promotes cost savings, involves
more businesses in the competitive bidding process, provides a forum for the use of new technol-
ogy, eliminates the need to construct special products meeting certain specifications, and retains
greater immunity from obsolescence than design specification. S. REP. No. 715, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 21-22 (1977).
138. GovT. PROC. CODE, supra note 113, part IV, para. (b) (ii). Because paragraph (b) does
not favor local rules, this decision may affect the role of state procurement practices in the United
States. See supra notes 65-92 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 124 & 127 and accompanying text.
140. TOKYO ROUND, supra note 112, at 80.
141. GovT. PROC. CODE, supra note 113, part V, para. 1. The OECD, see supra note 119,
divided the procurement terminology into two parts. GOVERNMENT PURCHASING, supra note 97,
at 6-7. The first category regulates tendering procedures according to the number of suppliers who
may bid for the contract. There are three types. Open or "public" tender, the broadest category,
permits any interested supplier to submit a bid without requirements of specifications. Id at 6.
Selective or "restrictive" tender allows the government agency to invite a specified number of
suppliers to submit bids. Id Single tender or "private contract" procedure permits the govern-
ment agency to enter into a contract with a single supplier. Id This practice is the most restrictive
type permitted.
The second category defines the tendering procedure according to the amount of authority the
procuring agency may exercise. Id "Automatic" tender grants the procurer the least possible
latitude. The procurer must award the contract on such predetermined criteria as lowest bid or
least amount of delivery time. Id "Discretionary" tender permits the award of a contract based
on a number of interrelated and basic criteria. Id at 6-7. The "negotiated" tender grants the
procurer the widest possible latitude. There are no predetermined criteria and the procurer con-
ducts all negotiations with the supplier. Id at 7.
Although part V of the Code recognizes open, selective and single tendering, the second cate-
gory serves to clarify the procedure. For example, an open or selective tender may be either
automatic or discretionary. Thus, one knows not only the number of suppliers involved, but also
the degree of discretion the procuring entity exercises. The single tender, however, is only negoti-
ated. Id
The use of these categories includes more than simply providing consistent terminology. For
example, the single-negotiated tender grants the procurer the widest possible discretion. This
method condones the favoring of domestic suppliers because the limited resources of the procurer
often precludes negotiations with foreign suppliers. Note, Eliminating NontariBarriers to Inter-
national Trade: The MTNAgreement on Government Procurement, 12 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
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selective tender 42 and permits a single tender only in limited in-
stances.' 43 Open tender, on the other hand, remains unrestricted. Al-
though open tender provides optimal transparency, fosters maximum
price competition and reflects American procurement practices,"
other countries rely on the selective or single tender to realize lighter
administrative burdens and diminished opportunity for collusion be-
tween the procuring agency and the potential supplier. 145
The nature of selective and single tender requires that each procur-
ing entity establish a list of qualified suppliers. The Code supplies
guidelines so that the qualification procedure does not foster discrimi-
nation between domestic and foreign suppliers and among foreign sup-
pliers.' 46  Other safeguards to preclude discrimination and add
transparency to procurement procedures include requirements that the
315, 327 (1979). Part V of the Code favors open-automatic or open-negotiated tenders, see infra
notes 142-44, in an attempt to eliminate a significant NTB that favors domestic supplier. See
supra notes 60 & 97 and accompanying text.
142. Paragraph 5 states that under selective tendering, the procuring entities shall still "invite
tenders from the maximum number of domestic and foreign suppliers, consistent with the efficient
operation of the procurement system." GOVT. PROC. CODESUpra note 113, part V, para. 5. Amer-
ican concern for the maximum number of bidders and other nations' concern for administrative
ease is obvious. See supra note 141.
Paragraph 6 further restricts the use of selective tendering. The Code requires that purchasing
entities keep lists of qualified suppliers, publish those lists, file notice of the conditions the quali-
fied suppliers met, and publish the dates of effectiveness of those lists. GOVT. PROC. CODE, supra
note 113, part V, para. 6(a). Finally, in an effort to expand the number of suppliers contacted
under selective tender procedures, on the request of a non-qualified supplier the procuring entity
shall "promptly start the procedure of qualification." Id part V, para. 6(c).
143. Single tendering cannot be used "in a manner which would constitute a means of dis-
crimination among foreign suppliers or protection to domestic producers." Id. part V, para. 15.
The single tendering procedure can be used only in five specific instances: when there is only one
supplier and no reasonable substitute; when there is a lack of tenders in response to open or
selective bids; when time constraints prohibit the use of open or selective tenders; when there is a
need for additional goods from the original supplier as either replacement parts or as a supple-
ment to existing supplies; and when the procuring entity purchases a prototype developed at its
request. Id. part V, para. 15(a)-(e).
Once there is a single tender, paragraph 16 of the Code requires that the procuring entity shall
prepare a written report. Id. part V, para. 16. The report must contain which provision in para-
graph 15 permitted the single tender, the name of the procuring agency, the value and type of
good purchased, and the country of the supplier. Id.
144. MTN STUDIES, supra note 64, at 317.
145. Id. at 317-18.
146. GOVT. PROC. CODE, supra note 113, part V, para. 2. This prohibition of discrimination
could not be more clearly stated than in paragraph 2(b).
(b) any conditions for participation required from suppliers, including financial guar-
antees, technical qualifications, information necessary for establishing the financial,
commercial and technical capacity of suppliers, as well as the verification of qualifica-
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agency issue notices of proposed purchase, 147 supply adequate time for
domestic and foreign suppliers to tender bids,148 publish certain infor-
mation on the bids, 149 and standardize procedures for the period after
the receipt of bids. 150
The Code further safeguards nondiscriminatory procurement prac-
tices by outlining procedures and conditions for publishing new rules,
regulations, and judicial decisions affecting government procure-
ment.' -1 This article also instructs the procuring entity to inform un-
successful suppliers of the reasons for the rejection of their bids and the
merits of the accepted bid.'52 The signatory nations disliked this open
procedure, traditionally endorsed by the United States to facilitate pub-
lic inspection,'53 for fear of administrative costs, "collusive bidding"
tions, shall be no less favorable to foreign suppliers than to domestic suppliers and shall
not discriminate among foreign suppliers;
Id. part V, para. 2(b)
147. Id. part V, para. 3. Paragraph 4 contains the content requirements of this notice; annex II
contains the publications used by signatory nations to publish notices. For the purposes of this
Note, Japan publishes its notices in KAMPO (the Official Gazette) and the United States publishes
its notices in COMMERCE BUSINESs DAILY. Id. at annex II.
148. Id. part V, para. 9(a). The complexity of the purchase, the extent of subcontracting
needed for the bid, and the estimated mail time determine this time limit. Id.
149. Id. at part V, para. 12. This paragraph lists the minimum requisite information needed
by the purchasing entity to make an evaluation of the potential supplier's bid.
150. Id. part V, para. 14.
151. Id. part VI, para. 1. Annex IV contains a list of the publications in which the signatory
nations publish changes and additions to the Code. In Japan it is GENKi NIHON HOKI (Compila-
tion of Current Laws and Regulations of Japan) and KAMPO. The United States publishes these
changes in many different sources, including Defense Acquisitions Regulation (DAR) and Federal
Procurement Regulations (FPR) contained in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) and in
various judicial decisions. Id. at annex IV.
152. Id. part VI, para. 2.
153. MTN STUDIES, supra note 64, at 331. The congressional policy declaration contained in
legislation establishing the Office of Federal Procurement Policy exemplifies the preference to-
ward openness in federal 'government procurement.
It is declared to be the policy of Congress to promote economy, efficiency, and effective-
ness in the procurement of property and services by and for the executive branch of the
Federal Government by-
(1) promoting the use of full and open competition in the procurement of products
and services;
(10) minimizing possible disruptive effects of Government procurement on partic-
ular industries, areas, or occupations;
(12) promoting fair dealing and equitable relationships among the parties in gov-
ernment contracting.
41 U.S.C. § 401 (1982).
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and the maintenance of high bids.' 54 The Code attempts to reconcile
these concerns by providing for a review of the decision of the purchas-
ing agency so that misunderstandings between the parties will be
quickly and equitably resolved.' 55
When bilateral dispute resolution ends in deadlock,' 56 the parties
possess an automatic right of access to the Committee on Government
Procurement, a formal mechanism established by the Code to resolve
disputes.1
5 7
Two important important exceptions to the Code exist.'58 The first
exception permits a nation to refuse to act or to disclose information
pursuant to the Code that would jeopardize its national security inter-
ests.' 59 The second exception permits a nation to exempt itself from the
Code when, as applied, the Code would endanger public morals and
national characteristics.
60
The design and structure of the MTN Government Procurement
154. MTN STUDIES, supra note 64, at 331.
155. GovT. PROC. CODE, supra note 113, part VI, para. 5. The Code permits government
intervention on behalf of a rejected supplier, id part VI, para. 6, even though this complicates the
dispute resolution process. This provision assures the aggrieved government that the procuring
entity awarded the contract fairly and equitably. Id
156. Id. part VIL, para. 1. The other codes adopted pursuant to the MTN, see supra note 7,
established similar administrative bodies. MTN STUDIES, supra note 64, at 346. The procurement
panel consists of government officials with trade relations experience as well as nongovernment
individuals. GOvT. PROC. CODE, supra note 113, part VII, para. 8. Citizens of those countries that
are a party in the dispute are ineligible for service on the panel. Id. Interestingly, panel members
serve in their capacity as individuals, not as representatives of their government. Id. The purpose
of this, presumably, is to remove the arbitration process from international political biases.
157. Id. part VIL, para. I, The Committee may convene a panel to address the issue and to
make factual findings. When appropriate, the panel submits a report of its findings and recom-
mendations to the Committee. Id. part VII, para. 10. If the aggressor fails to observe the recom-
mendations, the Committee may authorize the aggrieved party to forego application of the Code
in that party's relationship with the aggressor. Id. part VII, para. 14. Suspension of the Code
means that the censured party or nation no longer enjoys the conditional MFN standing among
the signatory nations. See supra note 132.
158. GovT. PROC. CODE, supra note 113, part VIII. An exception to the Code is an action,
contrary to the explicit provisions, that a signatory nation may take without losing the Code's
protection.
159. Id. part VII, para. 1. This exception only applies to procurement "indispensable" to
national defense or security. Id
Some commentators have little confidence in the "indispensable" requirement, arguing that the
term has broad connotations allowing most industries to argue that their products have defense
applications. Note, Eliminating NontariffBarriers, supra note 141, at 341-42 (citing K. DAM, THE
GATT LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 201 (1970)).
160. GovT. PROC. CODE, supra note 113, part VII, para. 2. This paragraph provides an excep-
tion when the signatory nation must "protect public morals, order or safety, human, animal or
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Code represent the procurement practices of all signatory nations.' 6'
The lack of standardization of administrative procedures, 62 technical
specifications based on design rather than performance, 63 and the fail-
ure of notification of bids and purchases'64 were blantant non-tariff
barriers associated with government procurement that no longer exist
after passage of the Code.
III. THE NTT AGREEMENT
The telecommunications network in Japan provides an example of
the effectiveness of the MTN Government Procurement Code. Japan
became a signatory to the Code in 1979.165 As a consequence, Japan's
procurement procedures now mirror those practices of other signatory
nations, although various minor technical differences remain. 66 After
the negotiations concluded, the United States offered $16 billion of
government purchases to foreign trade, later revising that amount to
$12.5 billion; Japan opened $7.5 billion worth of procurement to inter-
national competition. 67
Problems developed during the course of the negotiations and after
the negotiations concluded, but before the Code became effective on
January 1, 1981. One major problem concerned the extent to which
certain Japanese agencies would implement the Code. The dispute fo-
cused on the Japanese nationalized industries, including Nippon Tele-
phone and Telegraph (NTT), Japanese National Railways and the
Japan Tobacco and Salt Public Corporation. 68 Japan argued that the
plant life or health, intellectual property, or relating to the products of handicapped persons, of
philanthropic institutions or of prison labour." Id.
161. These Code's two exceptions, wholly unrelated, establish the limits within which the
Code operates. On the one hand, the defense exception illustrates that governments cooperate
among themselves to a limited extent, thereby respecting state sovereignty. On the other hand, the
public morals exception represents the limit beyond which no government is willing to apply the
Code at the expense of its citizens.
162. See supra notes 125-33 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 139-55 and accompanying text.
165. GOVT. PROC. CODE, supra note 113, at annex I.
166. See supra notes 111-64 and accompanying text.
167. IssuEs AND PROBLEMS, supra note 3, at 77. The disparity in these figures should not lead
to the conclusion that the Code endorses a lack of mutuality. Rather, these figures depend on
various levels of economic performance, including "relative GDP [gross domestic product] levels,
the relative amount of government intervention in the private sector, and the absolute size of the
government sector." Id at 77 n.1.
168. See Abbott & Totman, supra note 6, at 124-25 n. 124. The Code listed these nationalized
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nationalized industries contain independent purchasing authority and
therefore remain separate from the government. 169  The Japanese
wanted these nationalized industries exempt from the purview of the
Code because their combined budgets constitute approximately one-
half of Japan's budget.170
The United States and Japan tentatively resolved the problem of for-
eign access to Japan's nationalized industries in an exchange of diplo-
matic letters of December 19, 1980.17 1 These letters, known as the NTT
Agreement (Agreement), 172 addressed only the problems with NTT
and not with other nationalized companies. The Agreement outlined
the notification, qualification and tendering procedures needed for
nondiscriminatory and competitive opportunities to NTT procurement
pursuant to the Code. 173 It incorporates five "tracks," each describing
a different tier of sophistication of telecommunications equipment. 174
industries in annex I. GovT. PROC. CODE, supra note 113, at annex I. Yet, the dispute concerned
the extent to which entities would procure from foreign suppliers. The nationalized industries
constituted a large portion "of the Japanese market for value-added manufactured products in
which the U.S. firms ... [were] competitive." Impact, supra note 98 at 11 (prepared statement of
Abraham Katz, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for International Economic Policy). For a de-
tailed analysis of the problems with the NTT and the reasons for the disputes, see IssuES AND
PROBLEMS, supra note 3, at 59-84.
169. BuY-NATIONAL PRAcTicEs, supra note 99, at 6.
170. Impact, supra note 98, at II (prepared statement of Abraham Katz, Assistant Secretary of
Commerce for International Economic Policy).
Preliminary negotiations, subsequent to the conclusion of the MTN, resulted in a joint commu-
nique between United States Ambassador Strauss and Japanese Minister Ushiba on June 2, 1979.
The message acknowledged "that mutual reciprocity should be provided among Japan, the United
States and other major countries in access opportunities to each other's markets, including the
marketfor telecommunications." Text of Joint Statement by Strauss and Minister Ushiba, June 2,
1979, reprinted in IssuES AND PROBLEMS, supra note 3, at 204 (emphasis added). That the minis-
ters mentioned specifically telecommunications indicates the concern over the NTT and the lack
of progress in the negotiations.
171. Japan: U.S., Japan Accept NTT Telecommunications Pact, IN'L TRADE REP., U.S. EX-
PORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 338, at C-9 (Dec. 23, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Telecommunications
Pact ]. See generally Recent Development, Telecommunications, supra note 114 (letters-agreement
constitute an important development in United States-Japan trade relations, although the effec-
tiveness remains in doubt).
172. Letters Exchanged by USTR Askew and Japanese Trade Representative Okita and Text
of U.S. - Japan Agreement on NTT Procurement Procedures, reprinted in INT'L TRADE REP., U.S.
EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 338, at N-I - N-5 (Dec. 23, 1980) [hereinafter cited as N7T
Agreement].
173. Id. at N-I (text of a letter from Trade Representative Okita to USTR Askew).
174. Track I includes general noncommunications equipment used in the telecommunications
network. Id. at N-2. See also Telecommunications Pact, supra note 171, at C-9. Track II covers
the procurement of telecommunications equipment that already exists in the market or that re-
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Finally, the Agreement provides for non-binding arbitration if
problems remain unsolved after consultation. 75
The NTT opposed the Agreement because the integration of foreign
products would destroy the standardization of the Japanese telecom-
munications network. 176 In addition, the NTT used the "family,"-
Nippon, Old, Fujitsu and Hitachi-as its primary source of supply
prior to the Agreement, 177 and regarded this agreement as an infringe-
ment on that association. American business viewed the opening of
NTT procurement to foreign bidding not only as a possible representa-
tion of the Japanese government's good faith,178 but as a potential for
large foreign contracts totalling $3.3 billion.179 Thus, the NTT
purchases amounted to less than one-half of the $7.5 billion Japanese
government procurement opened pursuant to the Code. 80
The differences between Japanese procurement prior to the Code
and procurement pursuant to the Code appear significant. An increase
in foreign access and the resulting increase in foreign contracts measure
the degree of Japanese implementation. Thus, the framework exists on
which increased government procurement trade rests. The most signifi-
cant barriers to increased trade include the grudging abandonment by
the Japanese of the private contract negotiated tender and the diffuse
quires only minor modifications to meet NTT standards. N7TAgreement, supra note 172, at N-2.
Track II requires a "FRP/Announcement" in which the NTT publishes its request for particular
products, in addition to those bids the NTT solicits from its established suppliers. Id. at N-2. The
NTT then provides the firms that responded to the FRP/Announcement with procurement docu-
mentation that supplies the bidders with the information needed to submit a competitive bid. Id.
The firms selected through this procedure become qualified for Track I1-A. Id. Track II-A,
"[flollow-on purchases," concerned additional purchases of materials initially procured pursuant
to Track II; the procedures and tenders of Track II apply "mutatis mutandis" to Track II-A. Id. at
N-2 - N-3. Track II-A permits the NTT to maintain a list of qualified suppliers, "limited only by
the efficient operation of the procurement system." Id. at N-3. The status of "qualified" arises if
the firm successfully competes in Track II or if the firm requests qualification certification by the
NTT. Id Track III regulates the procurement of high technology to be developed for or with the
NTT that is presently not available in the market. Id. Track IIIA resembles Track I1-A except
that it covers follow-on purchases to Track III. Id. at N-3 - N4.
175. Id. at N-4.
176. Japan, Business Fi'hting Back, ECONOMIST, March 3, 1979, at 72 [hereinafter cited as
Fighting Back].
177. Issues and Problems, supra note 3, at 65-66.
178. Fighting Back, supra note 176, at 72.
179. Telecommunications Pact, supra note 171, at C-9. The NT offered to procure $3.3 bil-
lion, $1.5 billion pursuant to Track I of the Agreement and $1.8 billion pursuant to Tracks II and
III. Id.
180. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 62:127
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol62/iss1/4
GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT CODE
purchasing authority, in favor of public automatic tender and central
purchasing.18 1
IV. CONCLUSION
Government procurement in Japan and the United States prior to
the adoption of the MTN Government Procurement Code provided lit-
tle incentive for increased international trade. The Japanese and
American procurement policies rested on fundamentally opposing
principles. The federal Buy American Act and state buy-national laws
provide formal examples of blatant government procurement non-tariff
barriers.'82 Pre-Code Japanese procurement, on the other hand, in-
cluded very informal yet restrictive and closed practices.18 3
The MTN Government Procurement Code standardized procedures
among all signatory nations. The Code provided the means for lessen-
ing barriers to foreign suppliers for government procurement con-
tracts.' 84 The effectiveness of the Code became apparent shortly after
the negotiations concluded when the United States and Japan permit-
ted $12.5 and $7.5 billion respectively of government purchases to enter
international competition.'18 The NTT Agreement, as part of Japan's
liberalization of its procurement practices, involved about one-half of
the $7.5 billion procurement in an area previously highly restricted.'86
Not only does the NTT Agreement provide American suppliers sub-
stantial access to the Japanese market, it also represents substantial fi-
nancial gains for those suppliers.
Amidst numerous and complex local restrictive laws, the MTN Gov-
ernment Procurement Code established a favorable trend in govern-
ment procurement as demonstrated by the NTT Agreement. The
United States should further this trend toward better international
trade relations by revising its blatant protectionist policies. In light of
our acceptance of the MTN Code, Congress should eliminate the Buy
American Act and amend present procurement statues to conform with
the Code. Congress possesses the power to eliminate the Buy Ameri-
181. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 22-36 & 67-94 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 95-110 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 111-64 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 165-67 and accompanying text.
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can Act pursuant to the Trade Agreements Act of 1979.117 Finally, the
federal government should encourage the states to eliminate their buy-
national laws because they lack the compelling justifications that un-
derlie state buy-local laws, and because the lack of litigation under
these laws illustrates their ineffectiveness as protectionist measures.
The United States does not exist in a vacuum. As technology ad-
vances, the United States must assure its position in international trade
relations. Altering our domestic practices to conform with interna-
tional agreements would further this goal.
187. 19 U.S.C. § 2511 (1982).
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